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Prophylactic Rules and State Constitutionalism
Arthur Leavens1
ABSTRACT
When the post-Warren Supreme Court began trimming back individual
rights, some state courts responded by interpreting analogous or cognate stateconstitutional provisions to find broader protections, prompting a vigorous
debate concerning the legitimacy and interpretive methodology of such state
constitutionalism. How can two constitutional provisions, sharing the same
language and history, mean different things? This article looks at that question
in the context of so-called prophylactic rules—those specific constitutional
rules meant to guide the implementation of broader federal constitutional
principles. Miranda’s warning-and-waiver construct is probably the best
known prophylactic rule, but such rules abound, particularly in criminal
procedure.
This article argues that even if states ought to defer to the Supreme Court
concerning the meaning of cognate constitutional provisions, such deference is
not required in considering the reach of prophylactic rules. Such rules, while
constitutional in status, are not vessels of constitutional meaning. Rather, they
are a pragmatic means to implement more open-ended constitutional norms and
thus, by design, are adjustable where necessary to improve their fitness for that
task. The Supreme Court makes such adjustments, and there is no reason why
states should not also be able to do so where local conditions suggest the need
for a more protective rule. A state’s expansion of a prophylactic rule leaves
untouched the meaning of the underlying federal principle, along with the
Supreme Court’s prerogative to decide what that meaning is. This article
analyzes such rule expansions under Massachusetts law to develop this point
concretely.
But recognizing the latitude of states to expand federal prophylactic rules
unilaterally does not necessarily mean that it should be the courts that work this
expansion. Again using Massachusetts as the example, this article argues that,
depending upon the conceptual linkage of the rule to its underlying principle,
the designed impact of the rule, and the relative judicial vice legislative
1. Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I would like to thank Jim Gardner,
Eric Miller, Jamie Colburn, Jennifer Levi, Taylor Flynn, Giovanna Shay, Bruce Miller, Sam Stonefield, and
Leora Harpaz for their encouragement and thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article and Dean Art
Gaudio for providing support and assistance for this project.
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competence and legitimacy to make the cost-benefit judgments on which rule
expansion often rests, the expansion of some prophylactic rules ought to be the
province of the state legislature and not the courts. When it is unclear who
should decide, this article argues that a state court should not freeze a rule
expansion in constitutional principle, but rather should found its decision in
state common law, thus leaving open further reconsideration of the rule’s reach.
I. INTRODUCTION
For well over thirty years the phenomenon of “judicial federalism”—a state
court interpreting a state constitutional provision to provide broader protections
than those afforded by the analogous federal constitutional provision—has
become a fixture of American jurisprudence.2 This development, no doubt
prompted by the post-Warren Supreme Court retrenchment regarding the
protection of individual rights, has given rise to a rich debate concerning the
legitimacy and interpretive methodology of such state constitutionalism.3
Boiled down, the question is, on what basis does a state court interpret a state
constitutional provision, couched in virtually the same language and often with
the same history as that of its federal counterpart, and decide that the state
provision provides greater protection?
In this article, I examine that question in the context of so-called
prophylactic rules—those relatively concrete constitutional rules announced by
the Supreme Court to guide lower courts in applying the Constitution’s more
open-ended standards. Such rules abound, particularly in criminal procedure.
To take a familiar example, Miranda’s warnings-and-waiver rule constitutes
the means by which the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination protection is
implemented in the context of police interrogation. Less familiar, at least as a
prophylactic rule, is the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test meant to guide
application of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that a neutral magistrate
determine probable cause in issuing a warrant.
While I am among those who think a state court should ordinarily defer to
the Supreme Court on the meaning of a provision common to the federal and
state constitutions,4 I take a different view regarding the breadth of
2. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 177-78 (1998) (cataloging this
development).
3. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 13-15 (2005); TARR, supra note
2; Symposium, Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms: Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 46
WM.& MARY L. REV. 1219 (2005). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State
Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985); Lawrence Friedman,
Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State Constitutional Decision-Making, 77 MISS. L.J. 265 (2007); Jack L.
Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV.
793 (2000); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV.
379 (1980); Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy
Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1015 (1997).
4. See Arthur Leavens, State Constitutionalism: State-Court Deference or Dissonance?, 33 W. NEW

2011]

PROPHYLACTIC RULES AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM

417

constitutional prophylactic rules. I will argue here that there is no theoretical
impediment to a state’s unilateral expansion of federal prophylactic rules.
However, this interpretive latitude does not mean that a state’s courts should
necessarily enjoy that prerogative. I will argue that expansion of at least some
of these rules, as a matter of institutional competence and political legitimacy,
should be the province of the state’s legislature rather than its courts.
My argument accepts the following premises: first, prophylactic rules such
as Miranda’s warnings-and-waiver construct and Aguilar-Spinelli’s twopronged test tend to over-enforce the constitutional principles that justify their
existence5; second, such rules nevertheless have constitutional status; third,
provisions common to the federal and a state’s constitution ought
presumptively to mean the same thing; and fourth, the Supreme Court is the
presumptive arbiter of what that meaning is.6
Why should a state, presumptively bound by the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of a constitutional provision, nevertheless be free to expand the

ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that in interpreting state constitutional provisions which have federal
constitutional equivalents, state courts presumptively should defer to Supreme Court concerning meaning and
scope of such shared, fundamental norms).
5. See Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic
Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 951 (1999). I am principally interested in prophylactic rules, which as a matter of
accepted terminology are understood generally to over-enforce the constitutional standard for which they stand.
See id. I appreciate that such rules constitute but a subset of a larger category of rules created by the Supreme
Court to provide guidance concerning the implementation or enforcement of more indeterminate constitutional
standards. See id. at 950; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and
the Constitution Is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 579-80 (2007). Here I make a brief, if obvious,
disclaimer that what constitutes over-enforcement of a constitutional standard is often, if not inevitably, in the
eye of the beholder. It assumes that we can agree with some precision how a particular, relatively
indeterminate standard should “correctly” be applied in a particular factual circumstance. See Rosenthal,
supra, at 579-80. It is only with such a measuring rod that we can say that the prophylactic rule does or does
not over-enforce that standard given those facts. See id. As will be developed, however, if the standard’s
meaning was readily apparent there would be no need for the rule. See id. Professor Rosenthal makes an
interesting argument that Miranda’s warning-and-waiver requirements do not over-enforce but rather conform
to the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled self-incrimination in the context of custodial
interrogation. See id. See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987) (arguing Miranda consistently under-enforces
Fifth Amendment protection); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941 (2001).
6. I appreciate that none of these premises represent anything close to a consensus among either courts
or commentators that have considered these issues. I nevertheless adopt them with little in the way of analytic
defense for two reasons. First, the arguments both for and against each have been well made and my recitation
of them seems unnecessary. Second, these assumptions, if anything, impede rather than promote the claim I
make. If the rules in question were not federal constitutional commands, there would be little conceptual
quarrel with a state court taking a different path under its own constitution. If a rule routinely under-enforced
its underlying standard, there would be less about which to complain—the state court would merely be filling
in the gap; a gap perhaps purposely left as a matter of comity by the Supreme Court. And, if one takes an
expansive view of a state’s conceptual legitimacy in unilaterally expanding the protection of a shared
constitutional provision in the face of a contrary Supreme Court decision, it would seem to matter little what
the nature of the constitutional protection in question is. As an aside, I also adopt these premises because I
agree with them, but for purposes of the argument that is quite beside the point.
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reach of a prophylactic rule such as Miranda’s warning-and-waiver
requirement or Aguilar-Spinelli’s two-pronged test? The answer lies in the
nature of prophylactic rules and their relation to the underlying constitutional
standards they implement. Unlike a Supreme Court decision laying out the
meaning or scope of a constitutional provision—its “operative proposition” in
the words of Mitchell Berman7—prophylactic rules8 are relatively specific,
often bright-line rules meant principally to guide lower courts in implementing
less determinate constitutional principles such as the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement that a neutral and detached magistrate determine probable cause in
issuing a warrant. How is that requirement supposed to work when the police
seek a warrant based on information provided by an informant whose identity is
undisclosed? The Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test was crafted to provide the
answer.
Given their pragmatic, instrumental purpose, such prophylactic rules—
though surely constitutional—are, of necessity, more mutable than the
operative propositions they implement. I will argue that as such, prophylactic
rules are properly subject to unilateral state adjustment based on the state’s
experience with the rule. Because such adjustments often reflect a policy
judgment founded at least in part on a cost-benefit, empiricism-based analysis,
in some cases the legislature is better equipped than the courts to undertake that
analysis and has more legitimacy to impose the resulting policy judgment.
This article will examine these issues concretely, examining the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s (SJC) restoration of the AguilarSpinelli test under Article XIV of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights9
following the Supreme Court’s rejection of that test under the Fourth
Amendment,10 and the SJC’s expansion of three Miranda protections following
the Supreme Court’s rejection of those protections under the Fifth
Amendment.11 In the first part of this article, adopting Mitchell Berman’s
terminology, I will review the distinction between constitutional operative
propositions and constitutional decision rules (of which prophylactic rules are a
subset), and show that Aguilar-Spinelli’s two-pronged test as well as Miranda’s
7. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 8-11 (2004) (describing
prophylactic rules).
8. See id. Prophylactic rules are a subset of what Mitchell Berman calls “constitutional decision rules,” a
term which is more neutral and which, for our purposes, can be used interchangeably with “prophylactic rules.”
See id.
9. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 1985) (Upton II).
10. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).
11. Compare Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), with Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288,
1295 (Mass. 1992). Compare Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429-30 (1986), with Commonwealth v.
Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Mass. 2000). Compare United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2005),
with Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 203 (Mass. 2005). In the interest of full disclosure, my wife,
Laurel Brandt, formerly Assistant District Attorney for Hampden County Massachusetts, was the prosecuting
attorney in the Mavredakis trial. At no time has she revealed anything to me concerning this case that is not a
matter of public record, and she has played no part in the development of this article.
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warning-and-waiver construct12 fall into the latter category.
In the second part of the article, I will argue that these concededly federal
prophylactic rules are properly subject to review and enhancement under state
law. Massachusetts provides a particularly interesting lens through which to
examine this point for two reasons. First, despite the SJC’s occasional rhetoric
to the contrary, the Supreme Court and the SJC agree on the meaning and scope
of the constitutional provisions in question (the Fourth Amendment and Article
XIV; the Fifth Amendment and Article XII). With one possible exception,
which I will discuss, the federal and state constitutional operative propositions
at issue here are essentially identical. Second, the SJC has expressly declined
to adopt Miranda’s warning-and-waiver construct as a requirement under the
state Constitution, regarding it as exclusively a creature of federal law.
Nevertheless, I will argue that it is conceptually legitimate for the state to
consider expanding that federal decision rule under state law.
In the final part of the article, I turn to the question of which among a state’s
three constitutional branches should decide whether to expand these
prophylactic rules. As I will develop, several factors should be considered to
determine whether the courts or legislatures should make this decision. First,
the closer the connection between the rule and its underlying operative
proposition, the more it should be the courts’ prerogative to determine its reach.
Second, the closer the focus of the rule’s impact is to the judicial function, the
more appropriate it is for the courts to define that impact. Third, to the extent
that either the legislature or the courts have a comparative advantage in
measuring the costs and benefits of expanding a decision rule and in imposing
such a rule, it is more appropriate for that branch to be the constitutional
arbiter. Of course these factors, when weighed, may not yield a clear answer.
In such a case, a court might decide the issue provisionally, in a way that—
either expressly or as a practical matter—allows the legislature to reconsider
the matter and perhaps reach a different decision. That is, the court could
decide the issue as constitutional common law, not in the unalterable script of a
constitutional command. If the legislature subsequently adopts a different
view, the courts might then be called upon to determine whether the decision
should be within its constitutional bailiwick.13
I now turn to the arguments, first laying their foundations and then
developing them with reference to the Massachusetts experience.
12. By warning-and-waiver construct, I mean to include not just the requirements set down in Miranda
itself, but also Miranda’s progeny that have given shape to this intricate decision rule, both extending and
limiting its reach.
13. Cf. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and
Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030 (2001). Professor Klein argues
for a more active role for legislative and executive actors—federal and state—in crafting prophylactic rules and
incidental or remedial rights, but recognizes that “the Court will, of course, have the final say as to whether
alternative prophylactic rules and rights provided by legislators, law enforcement agencies, and state judges
sufficiently protect the Bill of Rights in a manner that the Court can effectively oversee.” Id. at 1054.
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II. OPERATIVE PROPOSITIONS AND DECISION RULES
Courts and commentators have long recognized that constitutional
jurisprudence comprises a broad spectrum of decision-making, ranging from
decisions that couch the meaning of constitutional provisions in terms of
expansive, often value-laden principles, to decisions that set out specific rules
to guide the application of such indeterminate standards.14 Over thirty years
ago, Henry Monaghan made this point in his influential argument that the
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence should be separated into those decisions
that have what he called constitutional status (i.e., have their basis in the
interpretation of constitutional provisions) and those that could more
productively and realistically be seen as constitutional common law designed to
advance particular constitutional interests but that could be overridden by
congressional action.15 Other scholars have since recognized differential
constitutional decision making, arguing that constitutional jurisprudence
necessarily includes doctrinal rules—often bright-line generalizations—that
may reach beyond core constitutional meaning but that nevertheless have
constitutional status.16 Coining terminology that has become accepted in this
discourse, Mitchell Berman distinguished between “constitutional operative
propositions,” which he describes as “constitutional doctrines that represent the
judiciary’s understanding of the proper meaning of a constitutional power,
right, duty,” and “constitutional decision rules,” which he terms “doctrines that
direct courts how to decide whether a constitutional operative proposition is
14. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981) (distinguishing between decisions setting
forth “fundamental [constitutional] principles” and those fixing application of such principles “in [a] particular
and problematic [context]”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1310-11 (2006) (distinguishing between constitutional standards and rules);
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1212, 1213-14 (1978) (distinguishing between constitutional concepts and constructs).
15. See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-23 (1975).
Professor Monaghan argued that this constitutional common law generally over-enforced what the Constitution
required, and thus could be trimmed by Congress without violence to Marbury’s command. See id. at 32.
Three years later, Professor Lawrence Sager argued that the Court often under-enforced the Constitution’s
meaning, leaving room for the states (and presumably Congress) to expand (or not) constitutional commands as
they saw fit. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1226.
16. See, e.g., John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights
Litigation After Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GA. L. REV. 733, 781 n.266 (2005) (noting widespread acceptance of
constitutional status of “prophylactic rules that protect constitutional rights by creating a buffer zone of
prohibited conduct beyond the scope of the actual right”). Professor Parry suggests abandoning the term
“prophylactic,” arguing that it interferes with the understanding that such rules are but a part of constitutional
doctrine along with judicial decisions concerning “what the law is” and remedies (as to which Congress may
have a role). See id. at 796-97 & n.327; see also Fallon, supra note 14, at 1279 (arguing emergence of gap
between meaning and doctrine sometimes acceptable); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (noting such doctrinal rules “capture[] the background
principle or policy incompletely and so produce[] errors of over- and under-inclusiveness”). But see, e.g.,
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 869-70 (1999)
(arguing such distinction conceptually insupportable). See generally Berman, supra note 7 (capturing debate
regarding status of prophylactic rules).
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satisfied.”17
The Court’s decision in Miranda epitomizes this dichotomy. On one hand,
the Court expanded the reach of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, holding that the privilege applied not only to
testimony in formal proceedings but also to police interrogation of suspects in
police custody.18 However, the Court also went on to announce what it
characterized as “concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow” in observing and enforcing this expanded
application of the Fifth Amendment protection.19 The Court suggested that
these “guidelines” were intended to provide but one path among many to
safeguard the underlying right,20 a suggestion that planted the seed for
subsequent attacks on the warning-and-waiver rules as being no more than
subconstitutional prophylaxis that can be ignored if their costs seem too high.21
Even in the face of the Court’s reaffirmation of Miranda and its warning-andwaiver construct as a constitutional requirement in Dickerson v. United
States,22 doubts concerning the constitutional status of Miranda persist.23
As many have pointed out, however, one does not have to view Miranda’s
warning-and-waiver construct as subconstitutional to accept that it stands on
different ground than a decision setting forth the meaning and scope of the
Fifth Amendment itself.24 Viewing the warning-and-waiver requirements as
one of many decision rules that, particularly in criminal procedure, guide the

17. Berman, supra note 7, at 9. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1732 (2008); Klein, supra note 13, at 1032-33 (characterizing such rules that
over-protect constitutional values as “prophylactic rules,” that under-protect as “safe harbors,” and remedies for
violations as “incidental rights”). Professor Berman points out that Monaghan, Sager, and Fallon each
articulate distinct and differing views of this process, but that each recognizes “two conceptually distinct
components” to constitutional decisionmaking. See Berman, supra note 7, at 36.
18. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-67 (1966); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442 (1974)
(stating “it was not until this Court’s decision in Miranda that the privilege against self-incrimination was seen
as the principal protection for a person facing police interrogation”); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1233-36 (1993) (recognizing this expansion of Fifth Amendment’s protection to
stationhouse interrogations); see also Berman, supra note 7, at 114, 117-18; Klein, supra note 13, at 1035-36.
19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42. Professor Fallon characterizes these guidelines as the “epitome of a
judicially manageable standard.” Fallon, supra note 14, at 1305; see also Berman, supra note 7, at 114
(pointing out Miranda’s guidelines as decision rules crafted to minimize adjudicatory errors).
20. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 467, 477, 479, 490.
21. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-09 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984);
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-48.
22. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
23. See Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600, 623-24 (2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting
Oregon v. Elstad, 407 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)) (noting “Court has made clear that there simply is no place for a
robust deterrence doctrine with regards to violations of Miranda,” and that “the ‘Miranda exclusionary rule . . .
serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself’”); Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760, 770-72 (2003) (four-justice plurality opinion) (Thomas, J.) (recognizing “violations of judicially
crafted prophylactic rules do not violate the constitutional rights of any person”). See generally Yale Kamisar,
Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . ., 99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001).
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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application of the more amorphous underlying operative propositions offers a
sensible perspective on their constitutional role.25 Constitutional protections
like the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination or
the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable
are not by their terms readily applicable in the field, be it a rapidly unfolding
criminal investigation or the more measured pace of a motions session in one or
another of the countless criminal courts bound to apply these bedrock
principles on a daily basis. Asking judges and the lawyers that appear before
them—not to mention police officers on the street—to achieve even a
semblance of consistency and fealty to such indeterminate constitutional
commands requires the use of some version of such rules, whether one calls
them “constitutional decision rules,”26 “prophylactic” and “safe-harbor” rules,27
or “concrete constitutional guidelines.”28 Not surprisingly, such rules abound,
though few have attracted the attention of the Miranda rules.29
To take a transparent example, in Chimel v. California,30 the Supreme Court
held that a search incident to arrest is reasonable, and thus lawful under the
Fourth Amendment, if it is confined to “the area ‘within [the arrestee’s]
immediate control’-construing that phrase to mean the area from which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”31 Concerned that
this principle,32 clear as it might seem, had proved difficult and confusing to
25. I mean here to include not just the requirements set down in Miranda itself but also Miranda’s
progeny that have given shape to this complex decision rule, both extending and limiting its reach.
26. See Berman, supra note 7, at 109. While Berman contends that the primary function of such decision
rules is to guide the judiciary in its application of the more indeterminate operative propositions, he
acknowledges the important secondary role that the rules play in providing actors bound by such constitutional
commands, such as law enforcement officers, with sufficiently clear guidance to ensure their conduct will
withstand judicial review. See id. at 109; see also Landsberg, supra note 5, at 959 (citing utilitarian function
decision rules play in guiding both lower courts and governmental officials in applying constitutional
standards).
27. See Klein, supra note 13, at 1037-47.
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
1, 25 (2001); Klein, supra note 13, at 1037-44; Landsberg, supra note 5, at 933; Kermit Roosevelt III,
Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1669 (2005);
David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 195-207 (1988).
30. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
31. Id. at 763.
32. This is a good example of Berman’s concession that it is often not clear where a doctrinal construct
falls on the spectrum marked at one end by operative propositions and the other by decision rules. See Berman,
supra note 7, at 61, 78-79. In Chimel, the Court redefined the scope of a search incident to arrest, overruling a
prior line of cases that permitted officers to search the area within the arrestee’s control, taking a constructive
approach to defining control and thus permitting a search of the arrestee’s domicile if he was there arrested.
See 395 U.S. at 760 & n.4; see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950) (setting forth earlier
rule), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Because Chimel strikes out in a new
direction by defining the constitutional limits of “reasonable” searches in the context of arrests—relying on the
function of the intrusion instead of a more abstract assessment of the connection between the area searched and
the arrestee—its holding could fairly be characterized as a new operative proposition as opposed to a different
decision rule. In fact, the Court, in Belton, described its earlier Chimel holding as setting out “the fundamental
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apply when the police had arrested the recent occupant of a car, the Court in
New York v. Belton33 held that, incident to such an arrest, the arresting officer
lawfully could search “the passenger compartment of that automobile . . . [and]
examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger
compartment . . . whether [such a container] is open or closed.”34 As a
justification for this rule, the Court observed:
[C]ourts have found no workable definition of “the area within the immediate
control of the arrestee” when that area arguably includes the interior of an
automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant. Our reading of the cases
suggests the generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of
the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within “the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab
35
a weapon or evidentiary item.”

Underscoring the status of Belton’s rule as a constitutional guideline in service
of the underlying Fourth Amendment principle—a “decision rule”—the Court
went on to say that “[o]ur holding today does no more than determine the
meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic content. It in
no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”36
As the Court recognized in crafting its decision rule in Belton, this brightline approach to constitutional analysis—substituting a generalization for caseby-case, fact-specific applications of underlying constitutional principles37—is
necessarily imprecise and often under-enforces or over-enforces the
constitutional operative proposition.38 If the Court subsequently identifies a
disparity between a decision rule and its underlying operative proposition that
has become too glaring, it is appropriate to adjust the rule, notwithstanding its
principles . . . regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.” New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981). But even if one views the Chimel measure of a search incident to an arrest as a
decision rule, the analysis of Belton’s subsequent rule is unchanged.
33. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
34. Id. at 460-61.
35. Id. at 460.
36. Id. at 460 n.3. Susan Klein characterizes the Chimel/Belton rule as a “safe harbor” that under-protects
the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be reasonable but provides police officers with concrete
assurance that if they follow its dictates, their searches in such circumstances will be upheld. See Klein, supra
note 13, at 1044-46. But see Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720-22 (2009) (striking down search that
complied with Belton’s rule, announcing modified rule in its place); infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text
(further discussing modified rule).
37. See Fallon, supra note 14, at 1320 (discussing nature and significance of constitutional theories).
Fallon notes that virtually all legal or moral rules are “entrenched generalizations” that either under- or overenforce the values they are crafted to serve. Id.
38. See id. at 1274, 1278, 1284 (observing such “substantive distortion” of constitutional measures
acceptable price to pay for clear rule); see also Landsberg, supra note 5, at 951 n.185; Sullivan, supra note 16,
at 58.
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constitutional status.39 In spite of grumbling about stare decisis,40 these
adjustments are not uncommon.41 Of course, too much tinkering with
constitutional rules undercuts the apparent legitimacy of the Court’s
interpretive authority,42 but given their pragmatic and derivative nature,
decision rules seem inevitably more mutable than the underlying constitutional
principles they are meant to advance—the operative propositions.43
III. DECISION RULES AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
How does this fit into the debate concerning the legitimacy of a state court’s
expansion of a constitutional protection through a broader interpretation of a
state constitutional provision? Even if, for reasons of interpretive legitimacy
and uniformity of our basic national law, the meaning and reach of
constitutional provisions common to the federal and state constitutions ought
presumptively to be the same,44 there is no good reason why federal and state
39. See Berman, supra note 7, at 113.
40. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723-26 (Justices Breyer and Alito separately dissenting from Court’s
reworking of Belton’s decision rule on grounds of stare decisis).
41. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009); Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1723-24. Just last year,
the Supreme Court adjusted two criminal-procedure decision rules, strengthening the Belton rule’s protections,
but eliminating another decision rule as unnecessary. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091; Gant, 129 S. Ct. at
1723-24. First, in Gant, the Court beefed up Belton’s decision rule regarding searches incident to arrest of
recent occupants of automobiles. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (describing Court’s holding in
Gant). The Belton rule, as it had come to be applied, permitted automatic searches of cars even though by the
time of the search the arrestee was fully in police custody, often handcuffed in a police cruiser. See Thornton v.
United States, 541 U.S. 615, 618 (2004). In Gant, the Court limited searches incident to arrests in such
circumstances to cases in which the arrestee “is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search,” at the same time conceding that this would likely be a “rare case,” or in
which “it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” 129
S. Ct. at 1719, 1723-24. Second, in Montejo, the Court overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986),
which had held the following: first, that an arraignment request for counsel effectively invoked the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel (which under the Massiah decision rule forbade the deliberate elicitation by the
police of a statement in the absence of counsel); and second, that once invoked, this right to counsel could not
be waived unless the defendant initiated the contact with the police. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091. In
Montejo, a five-justice majority opined that this “prophylactic rule” had outlived its usefulness, concluding that
the rule’s “marginal benefits [were] dwarfed by its substantial costs.” Id.
42. See Fallon, supra note 14, at 1329-30; Kermit Roosevelt III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Listening to
Non-Article III Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1303, 1320 (2008) (arguing legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking most vulnerable when courts work change on operative propositions as opposed to decision rules); see
also Berman, supra note 7, at 100-01 (suggesting stare decisis should have less impact in cases reviewing
decision rules as opposed to those reviewing operative propositions).
43. See Berman, supra note 7, at 113; Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1320. Roosevelt agrees with Berman
that decision rules should be less subject to considerations of stare decisis and argues that changes to decision
rules should be governed by their apparent workability as guideposts to the implementation of the underlying
operative propositions, the reliance that courts have placed in extant rules, the changes in the doctrinal
landscape since the rule was announced, and the changes in the factual circumstances that have emerged since
the rule was announced. See Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1320; see also Landsberg, supra note 5, at 972-73.
44. See TARR, supra note 2, at 174-85 (canvassing various approaches). This represents a polar view in
the state-constitutionalism debate, a view that is most hostile to state-court activism in interpreting cognate
provisions of state constitutions to provide protections beyond those of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 180-82.
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decision rules must similarly be identical. On the contrary, in our federal
system, subordinate state actors should be free to enhance the protection of a
decision rule if it appears necessary to achieve a better local fit with its
underlying constitutional operative proposition.45
Allowing states this leeway marks no incursion on the proper authority of
the Supreme Court, even though the decision rule in question is undoubtedly
federal. The underlying operative proposition, which is the presumptive
prerogative of the Court, remains unchanged.46 Any enhancement of the
decision rule risks only possible over-enforcement of that principle; the
operative proposition itself, as well as the protection offered by the Court’s
more permissive decision rule, remain protected.47 Even if one is concerned
that a federal constitutional provision—particularly one like the Fourth
Amendment that explicitly balances state and individual interests on the
fulcrum of reasonableness—might be over-enforced to the detriment of
effective law enforcement, the risks of state-law over-enforcement seem
relatively low. After all, state actors are closer to the action, and are better able
to determine how a particular decision rule is or is not working in that state to
advance the underlying operative proposition. Furthermore, states are better
positioned to assess and take into account local concerns, such as the potential
for over-enforcement.48 Simply put, a state’s striking this enforcement balance
in its particular locale would be more fine-tuned than a one-size-fits-all
decision rule crafted by the Supreme Court.49
It is thus no surprise that for many years the Supreme Court did not interfere
with state courts’ more expansive interpretation of federal decision rules.50
But see Sager, supra note 14, at 1217-20 (arguing there are good reasons Supreme Court might interpret
Constitution in manner that under-enforces its norms, leaving room for state courts and, if appropriate,
Congress to fill out reach of its commands).
45. See Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1327-28 (recognizing role for non-Article III actors, including state
courts, in adjusting decision rules); see also Klein, supra note 13, at 1054 n.108 (agreeing state courts may play
proper role adjusting prophylactic rules, but not safe harbor rules); cf. David A. Strauss, Miranda, the
Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 969 (2001) (arguing appropriateness of recognizing suitable
role for states and Congress to achieve what they see as right fit, at least in cases involving equal protection);
Parry, supra note 16, at 789 n.291 (citing authorities).
46. See Roosevelt, supra note 29, at 1716-17 (cautioning that recognizing authority of non-Article III
actors to work changes in decision rules underscores importance of conceptual distinction between decision
rules and operative propositions in order to avoid blurring Court’s exclusive prerogative to decide what
Constitution means).
47. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1248.
48. See Klein, supra note 13, at 1054 n.108 (observing Miranda explicitly invited such state adjustments
to its decision rule, but cautioning that limits to these changes must be congruent with and proportional to
underlying constitutional operative proposition); Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1320-22 (arguing nonjudicial or
state actors better positioned to assess factual changes contributing to decision rule’s “loose fit” with its
operative proposition).
49. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1255 (observing state courts play important constitutional role because
they “may have had substantial exposure to the details of the state experience”). One might suppose this
applies equally to state legislatures.
50. See id. at 1247-49. Indeed, until 1914, the Court was without jurisdiction to review state decisions
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However, the Burger and then the Rehnquist Court shut down this corner of
modest state independence, making it clear that the states are required to follow
the Court’s lead not only concerning what the Constitution means, but also how
it is to be applied.51 That effectively left state courts with state law—
principally their respective state constitutions—as the only means for
expanding decision rules, and then only if it is clear that the decision rests on an
adequate state ground independent of the Constitution.52 But as long as a statelaw expansion of a decision rule does not similarly expand its underlying
operative proposition, this unilateral expansion of a federal rule would not
constitute an intrusion upon the Supreme Court’s presumptive authority to
determine the contours of our nation’s constitutional norms.
The
Massachusetts cases discussed below demonstrate how this plays out.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Aguilar-Spinelli’s Two-Pronged Test
The Fourth Amendment facially requires that warrants be founded on
probable cause based on oath and affirmation. In a line of cases culminating in
Aguilar v. Texas,53 the Supreme Court fleshed out the issuing magistrate’s
central role in affording this protection, holding that warrants must be based on
probable cause determined—as a Fourth Amendment operative proposition—
by a neutral and detached magistrate based on “facts or circumstances
presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of [the affiant’s]
belief or suspicion is not enough.”54 As the Court elaborated, a court reviewing
the issuance of a warrant, while giving substantial deference to the magistrate’s
probable-cause determination, “must still insist that the magistrate perform his
‘neutral and detached’ function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the
police.”55 To exercise the required independent judgment that there is probable
cause, the magistrate must have access to the underlying facts.
The Court subsequently developed a decision rule—the two-pronged
Aguilar-Spinelli test—to apply this operative proposition in cases in which
probable cause is derived from a confidential informant’s tip. Under Aguilar,

striking down governmental actions as violative of the Constitution. See id. Even after the Court’s jurisdiction
was extended to permit review of such state decisions, the Court generally declined review in such cases. See
id. at 1244. As Professor Strauss notes, there seems to be no good reason to preclude Congress or the states
from balancing the costs and benefits in gauging the scope of and applying such rules as long as the Fourteenth
Amendment’s floor, established by the Court’s decisions, was not violated. See Strauss, supra note 45, at 969.
51. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-42 (1983). But see Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264,
274-81 (2008) (holding states not bound by federal retroactivity standards barring habeas application of “new”
federal constitutional rules and may extend such federal protection to prisoners seeking state habeas relief).
52. See Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1201 (2010) (reiterating requirement of clear and express
statement of separate, adequate, and independent state grounds to insulate state court constitutional decision
from Supreme Court review); Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-42.
53. 378 U.S. 108 (1964), abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
54. Id. at 112 (quoting Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933)).
55. Id. at 111.
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as elaborated in Spinelli v. United States,56 the Court required the police to
include in the affidavit the facts from which the reviewing magistrate could
determine both that the informant had demonstrated sufficient veracity to be
credible, and that the informant’s basis of knowledge was adequate to support
the tip. If, under this test, either prong was not satisfied, the magistrate could
not find probable cause unless she further determined from facts in the affidavit
that the officer’s investigative corroboration filled that gap, providing a basis to
conclude that the tip was nevertheless reliable.57
The Aguilar-Spinelli decision rule lasted fifteen years, until a more
conservative Supreme Court concluded that the demands of its two-pronged
test over-enforced the operative proposition requiring an independent
magisterial determination of probable cause. In Illinois v. Gates,58 the Court
thus jettisoned this decision rule and directed reviewing courts simply to apply
“common sense,” taking into account the “totality of the circumstances” set
forth in the affidavit, to determine if the magistrate in that case had an adequate
basis to find probable cause for the warrant she had issued. Under Gates, if the
affidavit, viewed from this perspective, contained a sufficient basis to support
such a magisterial finding, a reviewing court should defer to that
determination.59
The SJC did not agree, and in Commonwealth v. Upton,60 it went ahead and
applied the defunct two-pronged test to invalidate a search warrant under the
Fourth Amendment, explaining that the Gates decision had not abandoned the
test, but merely adjusted it.61 The SJC in Upton did not disagree with the
Supreme Court concerning the meaning or breadth of the requirement that there
be independent magisterial determinations of probable cause to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment’s operative proposition. Its disagreement with the Court
was rather that the Gates’ reliance on an unstructured review of the totality of
the circumstances was inadequate to ensure independent magisterial
determinations of probable cause based on information provided by an
undisclosed tipster. So, the SJC returned to the more demanding AguilarSpinelli decision rule.62 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in applying

56.
57.
58.
59.

393 U.S. 410 (1969).
See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Id. at 238-39. The Court also arguably loosened the definition of “probable cause,” thereby
announcing a new operative proposition, if that is how one reads the opinion. See id. at 238 (“fair
probability”); id. at 244 n.13 (“substantial chance”). Whether or not that is so is beyond the scope of this piece.
60. 458 N.E.2d 717, 720-21 (Mass. 1983).
61. Id. In an apparent attempt to stay within the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gates, the SJC read Gates as
adjusting the corroboration requirement of Aguilar and Spinelli’s two-pronged test rather than rejecting the test
in favor of a “standardless ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.” See id. However, the SJC was clear that if, as
turned out to be the case, Gates stood for a rejection of the two-pronged test for assessing magisterial
determinations of probable cause, it did not agree with that result. See id. at 723.
62. Id. at 721.

428

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XLIV:415

the Fourth Amendment, the SJC was bound by Gates, which—it scolded the
SJC—rejected the two-pronged test in favor of a totality of the circumstances
review.63 On remand in Upton II, the SJC reinstated its holding, this time
based on Article XIV of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts
Constitution.64
Although in Upton II the SJC said that Article XIV offered broader
protections than the Fourth Amendment, it did not hold that Article XIV had a
different meaning (i.e., that its operative proposition was broader than that of
the Fourth Amendment).65 Rather, the SJC held that the Aguilar-Spinelli
decision rule was necessary to implement that proposition,66 differing with the
Supreme Court’s view that the decision rule over-enforced the standard.67
Neither court was clearly correct regarding the necessity of the AguilarSpinelli test to ensure a neutral and detached magistrate; indeed, both may have
been correct. The Aguilar-Spinelli approach may be too demanding as a onesize-fits-all, national requirement. At the same time, it could well be that in
Massachusetts the Aguilar-Spinelli decision rule is necessary to ensure that
deputy clerk magistrates in the sixty plus district courts that issue warrants
every day have a sufficient basis to independently determine probable cause in
tip cases.68
Both these approaches could fairly coexist under the Fourth Amendment,
making it unnecessary for the SJC to rely on state law to resurrect this decision
rule. The Supreme Court was well within its prerogatives to decide, after
fifteen years of observation, that the Fourth Amendment does not require the
two-pronged test in every case to enforce its mandate of independent
magisterial decisionmaking in tip cases,69 particularly given the Court’s role in

63. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1984).
64. Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985).
65. See id. at 556-58. The SJC noted that Article XIV preceded the Fourth Amendment, the latter in some
substantial manner being based on Article XIV and both sharing in similar language. Id. at 555. The SJC
observed that in Gates, the Supreme Court had appeared to reformulate the definition of probable cause, but the
SJC expressly chose not to differ with the Supreme Court on that question. See id. at 554 n.7, 556-57.
66. See id. at 557 (noting two-pronged test “aids lay people, such as the police and certain lay magistrates,
in a way that the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test never could”). The SJC did not, of course, use the
terminology of “decision rules” and “operative propositions,” but the concepts fairly characterize what the
court did.
67. Upton, 466 U.S. at 732 (emphasizing that Gates “rejected [the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test] as
hypertechnical and divorced from ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
men, not legal technicians, act’”).
68. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1256 (noting likelihood of superior state court competence in applying
federal constitutional norms in particular circumstances of state). As noted, the SJC, in Upton II, specifically
pointed out the importance of a clear test, which in its judgment the Aguilar-Spinelli decision rule provides, to
“aid[] lay people, such as the police and certain magistrates [in determining probable cause] in a way that the
‘totality of the circumstances’ test never could.” Upton, 476 N.E.2d at 557.
69. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). Even as it struck down the Aguilar-Spinelli twoprong decision rule, the Court observed that its test provides appropriate guidance to magistrates in their
probable-cause determinations in tip cases. See id.

2011]

PROPHYLACTIC RULES AND STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM

429

our federal system of establishing constitutional minima below which no state
may go. Considerations of comity may counsel resolving doubts concerning
the reach (or even use) of decision rules in favor of under-enforcement, leaving
it for the states to be more protective in setting out more demanding decision
rules if warranted in that local context.70 And, the SJC’s holding that the twopronged rule is necessary in Massachusetts courts to ensure proper
decisionmaking by its magistrates in this narrow Fourth Amendment context
seems equally appropriate. The constitutional operative proposition is the same
in either case; the only question is how it should be implemented. But given
the Supreme Court’s insistence that it alone should decide not just what the
Fourth Amendment means but also how that protection should be put in place,
the SJC’s reluctant turn to the state’s parallel constitutional provision for this
decision rule71 was appropriate and did not undercut the Supreme Court’s role
as final arbiter of federal constitutional values.
B. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda
The Massachusetts experience with Miranda is more complex. As noted,
Miranda’s requirement of warnings and waiver is a decision rule designed to
ensure consistent and full enforcement of the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against compelled self-incrimination in the context of custodial
interrogations.72 It is openly premised on a set of interlocking presumptions
that all such interrogation is inherently coercive, that any statement by a
suspect during such interrogation is coerced and thus compelled under the Fifth
Amendment, and that the only way to overcome this presumed coercion is to
administer particular warnings concerning the right to silence and to counsel
during the interrogation. However, once the warnings are given and the suspect
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waives those rights, the presumed
coercion disappears and the otherwise compelled statement is presumed to be
freely given and not compelled under the Fifth Amendment.73 These are not
rebuttable presumptions, serving to assign burdens of proof in this factually

70. See Sager, supra note 14, at 1249 (noting “[u]nless compelling constitutional concerns are at stake,
there would seem to be no occasion for an abiding federal judicial role in policing state courts against overly
generous interpretations of federal constitutional values”).
71. See supra note 61.
72. See supra Part II.A; see also Berman, supra note 7, at 114 & n.345, 127-28 (noting principal function
of Miranda’s decision rule is reducing adjudicatory errors).
73. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). In his dissent, Justice White wondered how the
Court on the one hand can hold that stationhouse interrogation is inherently coercive, but on the other can be
confident that a suspect’s waiver of his rights in such an atmosphere is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, all
without knowing—as the Court concedes—what really goes on during such sessions. See id. at 535-36 (White,
J., dissenting). Echoing Justice White’s skepticism concerning this presumptive coercion, the Court has
recently cast the burden on the accused to “unambiguously” invoke the right to silence in order to claim
Miranda’s protection even if the accused never waived the right other than by ultimately answering questions.
See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259-64 (2010).
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murky area of stationhouse interrogation. They are irrebuttable, establishing
the ultimate fact of whether or not a confession was compelled by proof (or
not) of the warnings and waiver that preceded the confession.
Almost from the beginning, this decision rule was thought by many to overenforce the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination
in its newly minted expansion into the police station; that is, to function as a
prophylactic rule. As developed above, this does not doom Miranda’s
construct as a constitutional command,74 but to the extent that a decision rule is
thought to consistently over-enforce its underlying operative proposition, its
apparent legitimacy may be suspect. The SJC seems initially to have shared
this skepticism, explicitly declining to adopt Miranda’s warning-and-waiver
decision rule under Article XII, the provision in the Declaration of Rights
protecting against compelled self-incrimination.75
Relatively soon, the Supreme Court itself (with changed membership led by
Chief Justice Burger) set out to trim Miranda’s warnings-and-waiver decision
rule, characterizing it as a “prophylactic rule” not required by the Fifth
Amendment.76 Among its adjustments to the rule, the Court held that
statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach the
defendant if he testified inconsistently with his custodial statement,77 that
certain derivative fruits of a Miranda violation are not subject to the
exclusionary rule’s bar,78 that an unwarned statement taken to protect public
safety does not violate Miranda,79 and that a suspect’s waiver of the right to
counsel is valid even if the suspect is not informed that counsel is readily
available to consult with prior to questioning.80 These decisions seemed to
indicate that Miranda would be overturned,81 but that, of course, did not come
74. See supra Part II.A.
75. See Commonwealth v. Morrissey, 222 N.E.2d 755, 758-59 (Mass. 1967) (declining to accept Supreme
Court’s suggestion that it was free to adopt Miranda’s warning-and-waiver requirements under state law even
though decision not retroactive as matter of federal law). That refusal to adopt Miranda’s decision rule as one
required under Article XII of the Declaration of Rights continues through the present. See Commonwealth v.
Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Mass. 2005); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Mass. 1992).
Indeed, early on, the SJC was explicitly grudging in its enforcement of Miranda even under the Fifth
Amendment. See Morrissey, 222 N.E.2d at 759 (declining to exercise discretion to apply Miranda where not
required by federal principles of retroactivity).
76. The Court’s first such reference was in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974), decided eight
years after Miranda. It was repeated thereafter in cases cutting back on the warning-and-waiver decision rule.
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1984).
77. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
78. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314 (noting confession obtained soon after similar unwarned confession);
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 452 (providing testimony of witness identified through statement taken in violation of
Miranda). After Dickerson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and broadened its holding that a Miranda violation
required only suppression of the statement, not any fruits of that statement. See United States v. Patane, 542
U.S. 630, 636-37 (2005).
79. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655.
80. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986).
81. It is perhaps worth noting that not all of the Court’s adjustments or clarifications of Miranda’s
requirements cut back on its protections; some fortified those protections. So, the Court held that Miranda
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to pass. In Dickerson v. United States,82 the Court reaffirmed Miranda’s
decision rule, explicitly confirming its constitutional foundation, at the same
time reaffirming those post-Miranda decisions that limited its reach.83
Putting the rhetoric aside and looking at Miranda as a decision rule
necessary to the enforcement of the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination
protection in the difficult context of police interrogation, Dickerson and the
earlier decisions that it left in place seem justifiable.84 Miranda’s decision rule
(really, web of decision rules) is, like other such rules, founded on pragmatism,
and is, and should continue to be, subject to reshaping as its costs and benefits
become more apparent.85 But if pragmatism justifies the Supreme Court’s
contextual adjustments to Miranda’s constitutional decision rule, states should
be similarly free to consider further pragmatic adjustments as long as these rule
expansions are more protective of the underlying privilege and do not intrude
on the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret the Fifth Amendment’s meaning.
The three cases to which I now turn, Commonwealth v. Smith,86 Commonwealth
v. Mavredakis,87 and Commonwealth v. Martin,88 demonstrate this point.
Smith dealt with Miranda’s decision rule in the context of a serialinterrogation technique in which the police first question a suspect but only
administer the warnings and seek a waiver after the unwarned suspect
confesses. The officers then reinterrogate the suspect, typically leading the
newly warned suspect to repeat and even embellish his prior unwarned
admissions. Prior to Smith, the SJC had joined many courts across the country
in holding that this tactic violates Miranda. Even though the second statement
was preceded by the required warnings and waiver, the cat was already out of
the bag by the time of the second statement. Thus, the suspect—unless he
knew that the first, unwarned statement was not admissible at trial—had no
reason to think that the rights of which he had now been advised were anything
but empty formalities.89 Courts, including the SJC, thus held that the second,
applies not just to express questioning but also to its functional equivalent, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
292 (1980), that a suspect’s invocation of the right to cut off questioning must be “scrupulously honored,”
Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975), that a suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel bars further
questioning unless the suspect himself initiates further conversation, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482
(1981), barring even unsolicited questioning by different police about an unrelated crime, Arizona v. Roberson,
486 U.S. 675, 682-85 (1981), or such questioning even after the suspect has consulted with a lawyer, Minnick
v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990).
82. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
83. See id. at 443-44.
84. See Klein, supra note 13, at 1060-63 (accepting conceptual validity of limitations on Miranda, with
possible exception of Quarles’ emergency exception, but noting that, as practical matter, no right is absolute).
85. See Strauss, supra note 45, at 966-69 (arguing Court’s trimming of Miranda’s construct in Harris,
Tucker, Elstad and Quarles based on cost-benefit analysis and did not detract from constitutional status of
decision rule).
86. 593 N.E.2d 1288 (Mass. 1992).
87. 725 N.E.2d 169 (Mass. 2000).
88. 827 N.E.2d 198 (Mass. 2005).
89. See Commonwealth v. Haas, 369 N.E.2d 692, 699 (Mass. 1977); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 335
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warned statement was presumptively tainted by the first, unwarned statement
and therefore should be suppressed unless the prosecution could show that
there was an intervening event that cleansed the second interrogation of the
impact of the first, unlawful interrogation.90
This was all framed as a matter of federal law, required by the Fifth
Amendment. Or so the courts thought. In Oregon v. Elstad,91 the Supreme
Court held otherwise, opining that in such a situation, Miranda required no
more than proof of warnings and waiver prior to the second statement. Under
Elstad, the second, warned statement is admissible unless the reviewing court
finds that the police used “deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining
the initial statement.”92 Elstad marked the first time that the Supreme Court
weighed in on this application of Miranda’s decision rule, but to many, Elstad
constituted a trimming back of its reach.93 Following Elstad, the SJC revisited
the issue in Smith, holding as a matter of state common law that this practice
violated Miranda, and explicitly restoring Miranda’s decision rule to its preElstad state.94
Similarly, in Mavredakis, the SJC decided that another apparent loosening of
Miranda’s decision rule by the Supreme Court left the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination under-protected. Mavredakis dealt with the
scenario in which police interrogate a suspect whose lawyer is readily available
and has requested but been denied an opportunity to consult with the suspect
prior to or during the interrogation. The SJC had held under the Fifth
Amendment that in such a case, the suspect’s waiver would not satisfy Miranda
unless the suspect was told not only that he had a right to counsel during the
interrogation but that a lawyer was actually requesting an opportunity to speak
with him.95 The Supreme Court subsequently disagreed, holding, in Moran v.
Burbine,96 that Miranda required no such additional warning and waiver.97
The SJC reconsidered this issue in Mavredakis, restoring the rule that
Burbine had rejected and returning Miranda’s decision rule to its pre-Burbine

N.E.2d 660, 673-74 (Mass. 1975). Indeed, taken on their face, the warnings tell the subject that “anything you
say may be used against you in court,” and thus reinforce the notion that by his earlier statement the suspect has
given up the game. See Parry, supra note 16, at 757.
90. See Smith, 593 N.E.2d at 1291-92 (citing cases so holding).
91. 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985).
92. Id. at 314.
93. The Supreme Court itself encouraged that view, characterizing the warning-and-waiver construct as
prophylactic only; not required by the Fifth Amendment itself. Id. at 308-09 (O’Connor, J.). The Court
subsequently backtracked on that rhetoric, conceding that the warning-and-waiver construct was imposed on
state courts to guide their enforcement of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled selfincrimination. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
94. Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1296 (Mass. 1992).
95. See Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 176 (2000) (citing SJC cases so holding).
96. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
97. Id. at 422.
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contours.98 Unlike its decision in Smith, however, the court framed Mavredakis
in terms of Article XII, not state common law, suggesting, if not holding, that
Article XII provides greater protection than the Fifth Amendment against
compelled self-incrimination.99 If the SJC intended what it appeared to say—
that Article XII’s operative proposition forbidding compelled stationhouse selfincrimination is broader than that of its federal counterpart—this was both
unnecessary to the decision and an incorrect reading of existing precedent.
Mavredakis (like Smith) represents a more expansive view than that of the
Supreme Court concerning the decision rule necessary to implement the
protection against compelled self-incrimination in the stationhouse. Neither
Mavredakis nor Smith, however, depend on a state constitutional protection
against self-incrimination that is broader than that of the Fifth Amendment.100
Moreover, a review of the history and precedents of Article XII and of the Fifth
Amendment demonstrate that, at least insofar as they apply to police
interrogation, their respective operative propositions concerning compelled
self-incrimination are essentially the same.101 Once Mavredakis’s unnecessary
98. See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d
at 176-77.
99. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d at 177-78.
100. Interpreting Article XII to provide greater protection against compelled self-incrimination than the
Fifth Amendment in order to justify resurrection of the SJC’s pre-Burbine version of Miranda’s rule not only
misread Article XII’s history and prior interpretation; it needlessly conflated the common operative proposition
of two constitutional provisions protecting against compelled self-incrimination with the web of decision rules
intended to guide the application of that operative proposition. The problem is not simply one of conceptual
elegance, for this anchoring of Mavredakis’s expanded decision rule in the meaning of Article XII “calcifies”
this rule, making further adjustments in light of unforeseen consequences, changed circumstances, or a
reassessment of the rule’s wisdom beyond the reach of any decision maker but the SJC, and even for the SJC,
considerably more difficult than necessary.
101. See Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial Right” in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN.
L. REV. 987, 987 n.1, 1008 & n.118 (2003). The two constitutional provisions have common historical roots,
Article XII being a predecessor of, and one of the models for, the Fifth Amendment. Article XII’s terms, “[n]o
subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself,” are different, and seem broader,
than those of the Fifth Amendment, that “[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XII. However, authorities agree that
no difference was intended; the terms “furnish evidence” and “be a witness” being “virtually synonymous” to
the Framers. See Davies, supra, at 1008 n.118 (noting Article XII among eight state constitutional provisions
that served as models for Fifth Amendment). Professor Davies’ exhaustive review of historical materials
demonstrates that the textual differences between the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause and that of
Massachusetts were stylistic and not substantive. See id. at 998-1018, 998 n.62. From an historical standpoint,
both Article XII and the Fifth Amendment were aimed at pre-accusation judicial examinations of persons not
charged with—or maybe even suspected of—any crime. The earlier English experience with such inquisitorial
“fishing expeditions” by ecclesiastical courts and the Court of the Star Chamber, formally examining
uncharged persons in an effort to use the power of the oath, known as “ex-officio oath,” to force selfaccusation, was the core concern, not investigatory questioning by constables or other executive officers. See
id. at 1000-07. Indeed, at the time both constitutional provisions were written and adopted, there were no
police to speak of, with criminal investigation and prosecution still largely in private hands. Id. The Framers’
core concern—that of John Adams particularly—was to preserve the accusatory nature of the criminal process
by prohibiting judicially compelled self-accusation. Id. at 1001 n.77, 1010 n.123. Both privileges tracked each

434

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XLIV:415

rhetoric is stripped away, it does not expand Article XII’s protection against
compelled self-incrimination beyond that of the Fifth Amendment. Rather, it is
no more than a restoration of one aspect of Miranda’s decision rule
implementing that protection.
Reduced to their essentials, then, both Smith and Mavredakis represent no
more than a state striking a different and more protective balance than that
struck by the Supreme Court in crafting the decision rule implementing selfincrimination protection in the context of police interrogation. Neither decision
depends on a more expansive Article XII version of the underlying operative
proposition than that of the Fifth Amendment. These state law adjustments of
Miranda’s decision rule thus do not undercut the premise that the Supreme
Court presumptively ought to be the final arbiter concerning the meaning and

other during the century and a half that their respective protections were mutually exclusive, the Fifth
Amendment applying only to federal cases and Article XII only to state cases. The SJC interpreted Article
XII’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination to include not only protection against using the ex-officio
oath to compel self-incrimination, but also the common-law extension of that privilege barring compelled
testimony at one’s own trial (or the trial of others). See Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. 172, 181 (1871) (noting
“[t]his branch of the constitutional exemption [Article XII’s privilege] corresponds with the common law
maxim, nemo tenetur seipsum accusare [no man is bound to criminate (accuse) himself]”); see also Davies,
supra, at 1001-02 nn.78-79 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 68 (1st ed. 1765)). The Supreme
Court, in a like manner, extended the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination to include this
common law, “nemo tenetur” rule, barring the introduction of judicially compelled confessions at trial. See
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892) (holding privilege extended generally to testimony
compelled under oath, whether or not proceeding was criminal trial at which witness stood accused), overruled
in part by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). The Court, in Counselman, cited the SJC’s opinion
in Emery’s Case and observed:
It is impossible that the meaning of the [Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination] can
only be that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution
against himself. It would doubtless cover such cases; but it is not limited to them. The object was to
insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give
testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited
to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.
Id. at 562. The Court arguably went further in Bram v. United States, striking down a confession produced by
coercive police interrogation on the grounds that it was not voluntary and thus was barred by the Fifth
Amendment privilege. See 168 U.S. 532, 543-65 (1897). However, the Bram decision was strongly criticized
by Wigmore for, in his view, conflating the privilege against judicially-compelled self-accusation in formal
proceedings with the common-law protection against involuntary confessions. See Davies, supra, at 1038;
Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination
and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 170-71 (1992). Bram lay dormant as
precedent until almost seventy years later, when the Court dusted it off in Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 461-62 (1966). Whether or not Wigmore was correct in his criticism of Bram, the matter is moot
after the Supreme Court’s explicit extension of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination to police
questioning of suspects in custody. Cf. Herman, supra, at 170-95 (arguing common-law protection against
coerced confessions largely subsumed in common-law “nemo tenetur” protections once applied under Fifth
Amendment to governmental agents other than judges). That, of course, is the holding of Miranda, and the
SJC asserts not that Article XII’s self-incrimination privilege stops short police interrogation, but that it
somehow goes farther. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 203 (Mass. 2005); Commonwealth v.
Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Mass. 2000).
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scope of a shared constitutional provision.102
Martin, the third case, is different, although it too marks an expansion of
Miranda appropriate for a state to consider. Martin addressed the question of
remedy, specifically whether, in addition to any statement unlawfully obtained,
the derivative fruits of a Miranda violation (in Martin, a gun that the police
found as a result of an unwarned statement) must be suppressed. The Supreme
Court, in United States v. Patane,103 earlier held that suppression of an
unwarned statement fully vindicates the Fifth Amendment’s protection against
compelled self-incrimination and that the derivative fruits of a Miranda
violation—in that case also a gun found as a result of the unwarned
statement—should not be suppressed.104 The SJC disagreed in Martin, holding
that the gun as well as the unwarned statement must be suppressed.105
The SJC explicitly grounded Martin in its view that police failure to
administer warnings to suspects prior to custodial interrogation is “illegal,”106
“‘an improper police tactic’ that is strongly to be discouraged.”107 In order to
advance what it called “Miranda’s prophylactic purpose,”108 the court held as a
matter of state common law that derivative fruits of Miranda violations must be
suppressed. “To do otherwise,” in the words of the court, “would countenance
precisely the kind of police interrogation we have intended to deter.”109 Such
an instrumental use of the suppression remedy, what Susan Klein has called a
“constitutional incidental right,”110 seems plainly to be a proper prerogative of a
state, even where both the decision rule and its underlying operative

102. The fact that the SJC has declined to adopt Miranda’s decision rule as one required by Article XII
does not foreclose the state-law expansion of that rule in Smith or Mavredakis. See supra note 75. The refusal
to adopt Miranda as an Article XII requirement came in cases in which the SJC held that Miranda’s rule
adequately implemented the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled self-incrimination—protection
the same as that mandated by Article XII and that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the SJC to enforce. See
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Mass. 1992) (declining to extend Miranda’s requirements
under Article XII to public school principal’s questioning of student). In such cases, as the SJC put it, “[t]here
has been no need to consider the question [of whether Article XII separately requires Miranda’s decision rule]
because Miranda warnings furnish information about State constitutional rights as well as rights contained in
the Constitution of the United States.” Id. The SJC went on to note that should Miranda be deemed inadequate
to protect the state constitutional privilege, the SJC could look to common law to provide that additional
protection. See id. This is precisely what the court did in Smith and what it could have done in Mavredakis.
103. 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
104. Id. at 636-37.
105. Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 200 (Mass. 2005).
106. Id. at 203 (quoting Commonwealth v. Haas, 369 N.E.2d 692, 699 (Mass. 1977)) (basing holding on
Fifth Amendment principles).
107. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1288 (1992)).
108. Id.
109. Martin, 827 N.E.2d at 203.
110. See Klein, supra note 13, at 1047 (characterizing “constitutional incidental rights” as judicially
created “rights which are not themselves mandated by the constitutional clause the right is designed to further”
and offering as prime example exclusionary rule suppressing evidence illegally seized under Fourth
Amendment in order to deter police violations of Amendment’s operative command, as opposed to restoring
privacy interests that have been irreparably breached).
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proposition are federal. The SJC’s decision in Martin does not conflict with the
Supreme Court regarding either the meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s selfincrimination clause or the reach of the decision rule applying it in the police
station. The SJC differs with the Supreme Court only on what is necessary to
encourage the police to follow the rule—a difference that marks no incursion
on the Supreme Court’s role as the presumptive arbiter on issues of
constitutional meaning. It is thus no surprise that there is a longstanding
history of state independence in crafting remedies for federal constitutional
violations as long as those remedies are at least as protective as those that the
Supreme Court has held are required by the Constitution.111 If Martin is what it
purports to be—an adjustment of the Miranda remedy to encourage full police
compliance with its requirements—it presents no conceptual problem as a statelaw construct.
But there is another plausible theory justifying the suppression of the gun in
Martin, one resting on an interpretation of Article XII providing broader
protection than that of the Fifth Amendment. In Patane, the Supreme Court (at
least a three-judge plurality) characterized the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against compelled self-incrimination as a “trial right,” fully vindicated by
excluding a governmentally compelled statement at its maker’s criminal trial.112
In contrast, for well over a century the SJC has interpreted Article XII to
provide for an apparently broader privilege, one that protects against not just
the use of compelled statements at trial but against compelled self-accusation
generally.

111. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26-27 (1949) (holding Fourth Amendment protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and thus
binding on states, but allowing states to determine appropriate remedy for Fourth Amendment violation),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In declining to require suppression as the remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation, Justice Frankfurter wrote,
[T]he ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different order [than does the nature
of the right itself]. How such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against it should
be afforded, the means by which the right should be made effective, are all questions that [should be
left to] . . . varying solutions which spring from an allowable range of judgment.
Id. at 28. Of course, twelve years later the Court reversed course in Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(overruling Wolf). In Mapp, the Court held that the remedy of exclusion is required by the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 655. But the important point for our purposes is not the Fourth Amendment holding, but that the Court
recognized a legitimate role for the states in crafting remedies for federal constitutional violations. Even today,
when the Court has become far more zealous in its prerogative as keeper of the Constitution, the remnants of
this longstanding tradition—that states may craft their own respective remedies for federal violations—remain.
See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 275-82 (2008) (holding states free under state habeas law to extend
“new federal rule” to petitioners seeking habeas review of their convictions, though such relief barred under
federal habeas law).
112. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 637, 641 (2004); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760, 767 (2003) (Thomas, J.) (writing for four-judge plurality similarly characterizing Fifth Amendment
protection against compelled self-incrimination as “trial right”).
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In Emery’s Case,113 decided in 1871, the SJC reviewed a statute that
required witnesses in particular legislative proceedings to testify, explicitly
providing that such compelled testimony could not be used against such a
witness at any subsequent criminal trial. The SJC held that this immunity was
insufficient to protect Article XII’s privilege, observing that Article XII
protects a witness not just against such trial use of compelled statements but
also against being compelled ahead of trial “to disclose the circumstances of his
offence, the sources from which, or the means by which evidence of its
commission, or of his connection with it, may be obtained, or made effectual
for his conviction.”114 Even if never offered against the witness at trial, such
compelled disclosures, the court noted, “might furnish the only means of
discovering the names of those who could give evidence concerning the
transaction, the instrument by which a crime was perpetrated, or even the
corpus delicti itself.”115 The court held that Article XII’s protection forbade
such a result.116 In the court’s view, the only immunity that would adequately
protect against being compelled not just to confess, but also to give over the
means by which his criminality might be proved, was transactional immunity,
which the court thus held was necessary to overcome Article XII’s privilege.117
This view of Article XII arguably requires—as a necessary corollary of its
constitutional privilege protecting against compelled self-accusation—
suppression of physical evidence disclosed by compelled statements. Just as
Emery was constitutionally privileged to avoid handing over his papers that had
been subpoenaed,118 now that the privilege extends to custodial interrogation,
Martin should similarly be privileged to avoid being compelled to direct the
police to his gun. Forced by subpoena to hand over his papers, Emery was
protected by transactional immunity, which put him in the same position as he
would have been if he not been compelled to testify and there to deliver his
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

107 Mass. 172 (1871).
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Emery’s Case, 107 Mass. at 185. This Article XII requirement of transactional immunity remains in
force. See Attorney Gen. v. Colleton, 444 N.E.2d 915, 918-20 (Mass. 1982). In contrast, the Supreme Court
long ago cut back the Fifth Amendment immunity requirement from transactional to derivative use. See
generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
118. See Commonwealth v. Hughes, 404 N.E.2d 1239 (Mass. 1980). In Hughes, the SJC struck down a
court order that the defendant produce a gun the Commonwealth alleged he had used in a charged assault by
means of a dangerous weapon. See id. at 1240-41. The SJC reasoned that production of the weapon would
constitute an implicit statement concerning the “existence, location and [defendant’s] control” of the gun, and
that forcing such a statement through a court order backed by the power of contempt violated the defendant’s
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. See id. at 1244-45. The SJC founded its decision in the Fifth
Amendment, but noted that if the Fifth Amendment did not require this result, Article XII of the Constitution of
the Commonwealth’s Declaration of Rights would, citing Emery’s Case. Id. at 1246. If a court cannot,
consistent with the privilege, compel a suspect to produce a gun, it is no great leap to say that neither may a
police officer. If that order to produce the gun is unlawful, the resulting gun would seem to be that order’s
direct, and suppressible, fruit.
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papers. Of course, when questioned, Martin had no practical access to
transactional immunity, and so any physical evidence to which his unwarned
statement led arguably must be suppressed. This suppression is not to deter
police but to put Martin and those like him in the same position as they would
have been had their statements not been compelled.119 The suppression remedy
is a measure of, and is measured by, the privilege ignored.120
If this were the basis for the SJC’s decision, it nevertheless would not
constitute state-court defiance of the Supreme Court concerning the meaning of
a shared constitutional provision. The SJC reached this result under Article XII
in 1871, two decades before the Supreme Court first addressed the issue under
the Fifth Amendment,121 and over 130 years before the Court appeared to
retrench on the reach of the self-incrimination provision in Patane.122 In sum,
whether as an instrumental “incidental right” crafted as a way to buttress
Miranda’s decision rule, or as a remedy that is a necessary corollary to Article
XII’s longstanding protection against self-accusation, there is no conceptual
roadblock to the state-law enhancement of the remedy in Martin.
Now the final question: who should decide?
IV. WHO SHOULD DECIDE: COURT OR LEGISLATURE?
I assume it is too plain for argument that the executive is not a candidate for
this constitutional decisionmaking. Where the decision rules are ones of
criminal procedure, the executive has a stake in the outcome and therefore
would have no claim to legitimacy. Decision rules must be crafted by either
the court or the legislature. Given the pragmatic cast of decision rules and their
derivative relationship to the operative propositions they are meant to apply,
determining which of the two is best suited to expand a particular decision rule
depends on three factors.
First is the relationship between the decision rule in question and the
operative proposition it is intended to apply. As noted, constitutional
decisionmaking occurs along a spectrum, with operative propositions and
decision rules constituting polar categories. In the middle, it may be difficult to
characterize a particular decision as either one or the other. The closer a
decision rule is to the operative proposition that underlies it, or in other words,
119. As noted above, the fact that the SJC has never adopted Miranda’s decision rule under Article XII
does not foreclose its decision here to expand the reach of that rule to implement Article XII’s apparently
broader protection that includes the privilege. See supra note 101. Until the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Patane and Chavez, the SJC had every reason to think that the privilege was a part of the Fifth Amendment as
well as Article XII, both protected by Miranda’s decision rule. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 360
(2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003); supra note 100.
120. See Parry, supra note 16, at 783-85 (arguing remedy is “cash value” of a right, and should be
considered part and parcel of it).
121. See supra note 100.
122. As noted, this conception of the Fifth Amendment protection as a “trial right” first appeared in
Chavez, also in a plurality opinion by Justice Thomas. See 538 U.S. at 767.
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the tighter the correspondence between the two, the more its adjustment would
seem to be the legitimate prerogative of the court—the institution vested with
the authority to interpret the constitution.123 Stated differently, to the extent
that the expansion of a decision rule is justified by a principled, integral
connection to its underlying operative proposition, it seems legitimate as a
judicial decision; to the extent that such expansion is driven by policy based in
empiricism, it seems more properly a legislative function.124
Second is the impact of the decision rule in question. Adjustment of
decision rules that principally impact the adjudicative process should be the
prerogative of the courts. So, the responsibility for adjusting decision rules
designed to reduce adjudicatory error in applying the underlying operative
proposition125 should fall to the courts. Not only is it the courts that apply these
rules in adjudication, but identifying instances of adjudicatory error necessarily
requires first determining what the operative proposition means or how it is
meant to apply. Such interpretive determinations are quintessentially a judicial
function. On the other hand, decision rules primarily meant to guide nonjudicial actors such as law enforcement officials in their application of
operative propositions “on the street,” would seem less the exclusive
prerogative of the courts. Using a decision rule as a “stick” to ensure police
compliance with an operative proposition likely involves empirical judgments
and assessment of extra-judicial costs that may more properly fall to the
legislature as a matter of both legitimacy and competence.
Third, the institutional competence to identify and assess the costs and
benefits of a decision rule’s expansion and the political legitimacy to make the
judgments that justify that expansion is the final factor to be considered.126 If a
branch has an apparent competence or legitimacy advantage, it is better
123. Professor Fallon makes the point well, arguing that while judicial review may lack democratic
legitimacy due to its counter-majority nature, it promotes overall governmental legitimacy to the extent that it
protects against violations of, mostly, individual rights. See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1716-18. In that view,
the legitimacy of judicial review in cases such as we are considering (which surely involve individual rights)
depends on a principled connection between the decision rule at issue and the underlying operative proposition.
Cf. Berman, supra note 7, at 101-03 (asserting legislature’s role in crafting constitutional rules should be
confined to decision rules); Klein, supra note 13, at 1051 & n.97 (contending constitutional operative
propositions not subject to legislative revision, unlike prophylactic rules).
124. See Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1308-09 (distinguishing judicial authority from legislative authority
by observing judicial departures from precedent require justification in recognized principles).
125. Mitchell Berman argues that this is the principal function of, and strongest claim to legitimacy for, a
decision rule. See Berman, supra note 7, at 154.
126. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1360
(2006) (arguing courts have no demonstrable competency advantage over legislatures in determining what
constitutional rights people have); see also Berman, supra note 6, at 103-05; Roosevelt, supra note 29, at 165861 (noting difference in judicial and legislative competence on particular kinds of questions as factor in
whether courts ought to create decision rules); supra note 16 and accompanying text. But see Fallon, supra
note 17, at 1709 (asserting “courts are likely to have a perspective that may make them more sensitive than
legislatures to some possible rights violations . . . [due in part to] judges’ professional training and mission
[that] involves a solicitude for rights as they have historically been understood”).
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positioned to decide if and how the decision should be adjusted.
I do not mean to suggest that these factors are independent of one another;
they plainly are not. A decision rule meant to guide police in applying a
constitutional command, for example, requires identifying the underlying
operative proposition. It also likely implicates adjudication of the proposition
through claims that the police have violated it in enforcing the law. Each
decision rule may involve costs and benefits that are both adjudicatory (e.g.,
trade-offs in fit with the operative proposition for clarity of application) and not
(e.g., the degree to which effective law enforcement should be sacrificed in
order to ensure greater police compliance with an operative proposition).
Balancing factors in a particular case may point with reasonable clarity to one
branch or the other. In another case, however, the balance may be not at all
clear, counseling a court to decide the issue but leaving it open to the
legislature to address the issue anew. So, how does this play out?
A. The Fourth Amendment and Aguilar-Spinelli’s Two-Pronged Test
Aguilar-Spinelli’s decision rule, that a tip-based warrant must be founded
upon an affidavit that allows the magistrate to assess both an informant’s
veracity and basis of knowledge, is a decision rule that is completely
appropriate for a court to impose.
First, the two-pronged test is closely related to its underlying operative
proposition, which requires an independent determination of probable cause by
a neutral and detached magistrate. In the SJC’s view, both prongs of the test—
the first focused on the veracity of the informant from whom the tip came and
the second focused on the basis for the informant’s information—are essential
to assessing probable cause based on a tip, and thus “each element of the test
must be separately considered and satisfied or supplemented in some way.”127
Without this test, in the eyes of the SJC, the Fourth Amendment’s and Article
XIV’s core protection against searches without probable cause would be
reduced to dependence on untested, potentially unreliable tips.128

127. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 557 (Mass. 1985).
128. See Commonwealth v. Upton, 458 N.E.2d 717, 723 (Mass. 1983), rev’d, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). In
Gates, the Supreme Court did not dispute that the Aguilar-Spinelli decision rule was closely related to its
underlying operational proposition. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Indeed, the Court conceded
that “a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting [informant] tips is required by the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. at 238. The two prongs of the test are “relevant considerations in the totality-of-thecircumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations.” Id. at 233. Recognizing
that the Aguilar-Spinelli rule “[left] virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants,” the Court rejected the
test as too demanding. Id. at 238. This was the point of disagreement. To the Supreme Court, the two-pronged
test is a prophylactic rule that detrimentally overprotects the underlying operative proposition requiring
independent magisterial determinations of probable cause; to the SJC, it is a decision rule necessary to ensure
compliance with that constitutional command. See Upton, 476 N.E.2d at 557 (holding independent
consideration and satisfaction of both prongs of two-pronged test necessary and observing that enforcing test
“will tend to reduce the number of unreasonable searches conducted in violation of Article XIV”).
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Second, the impact of the decision rule is directed at the determination of
probable cause based on informant information, and the rule is principally
intended to guide judicial officials who must make that determination (and,
secondarily, to instruct the law enforcement officers who seek such warrants)
regarding the proper framework for that decision—a supervisory task that lies
at the heart of a court’s competence and legitimate authority. Particularly in
Massachusetts, where not only the police but many of the magistrates who
issue warrants may be persons without formal legal training, the SJC’s
determination that the two-pronged test for determining tip-based probable
cause “aids lay people, such as the police and certain magistrates, in a way that
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test never could”129—an entirely appropriate
judicial task. The court was explicit in its expectation that maintenance of the
Aguilar-Spinelli test as opposed to its abandonment “will tend to reduce the
number of unreasonable searches conducted in violation of Article XIV.”130
Finally, the SJC seems as well if not better positioned than the legislature, as
a matter of both institutional competence and political legitimacy, to assess the
costs and benefits attending the rule and to weigh these considerations in
determining whether to maintain the two-pronged test under Article XIV. In its
decision, the court noted the successful experience of Massachusetts police
over the prior twenty years in complying with the demands of the test.131 That
is a historical fact discernible from the court’s experience reviewing warrant
applications that the court seems competent to determine. Even more plainly
within the court’s competence is its conclusion that the test had not, over those
twenty years, interfered with the deference that reviewing courts are supposed
to give to magisterial determinations of probable cause.132 After all, observing
that deference (or the asserted lack thereof) and measuring it against the
appropriate legal standard is quintessentially within the purview of a state’s
highest court, both as a matter of competency and legitimacy. While the
court’s assessment that the number of cases in which evidence had been
suppressed during the prior twenty years of Aguilar-Spinelli’s existence “has
not been substantial in relation to the number of challenges made to the
adequacy of the applications for search warrants”133 depends on the eye of the
beholder, it appears the court would have the best access to facts underlying
that conclusion.
Whether or not one agrees with the SJC on the merits, the court was well
within its competence and legitimate prerogatives in restoring a decision rule
designed to ensure the effectiveness of the operative proposition requiring
independent judicial determinations of probable cause.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Upton, 476 N.E.2d at 557.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 557 (Mass. 1985).
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B. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda
In contrast to the SJC’s decision to maintain the Aguilar-Spinelli decision
rule, the three SJC decisions expanding Miranda’s decision rule raise questions
concerning their legitimacy as judicial acts. At least one, and perhaps two, of
these decision-rule expansions seem more properly the prerogative of the
legislature. Only in Commonwealth v. Smith,134 is it reasonably clear that the
SJC was the appropriate governmental branch to expand Miranda’s protections.
1. Smith: A Defensible Judicial Expansion of Miranda
In Smith, it will be recalled, the SJC addressed the serial-interrogation
technique in which police question a suspect without administering the
Miranda warnings, elicit an incriminatory statement, then—after a brief
break—administer the warnings, elicit a waiver, and then a repeated recitation
of the pre-warning incriminatory statement, often embellished.135 The Supreme
Court held in Elstad that such intermediate warnings satisfied Miranda, and
thus that the subsequent statement was not compelled under the Fifth
Amendment unless the police used “deliberately coercive or improper tactics in
obtaining the initial statement.”136 The SJC’s rejection of Elstad’s approach,
while not so clearly so as its restoration of the Aguilar-Spinelli test in Upton II,
was an appropriate exercise of judicial authority.
The relationship between Smith’s elaboration of Miranda’s decision rule and
Miranda’s underlying operative proposition extending the self-incrimination
privilege to the stationhouse is closer than might first appear. To be sure, the
SJC in Smith was plainly interested in deterring Miranda violations, fashioning
a “presumed taint” that attaches to any statement that follows a Miranda
violation to achieve that end. From this perspective, the Smith rule looks more
like a means to achieve police compliance with Miranda’s decision rule
requiring warnings and waiver than a requirement integral to Miranda’s
underlying operative proposition extending the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination to police interrogations. However, the core of the court’s
concern was the possibility that police could systematically use the serialinterrogation technique to circumvent Miranda’s requirements,137 resulting in
statements that: (1) under Miranda are “by definition coerced,”138 and (2) in
the case of a suspect such as Smith—who was young, poorly educated,
isolated, and uninformed of his rights—are in a very real sense compelled.139

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

593 N.E.2d 1288 (Mass. 1992).
See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text; see also Smith, 593 N.E.2d at 1290-91.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985).
See Smith, 593 N.E.2d at 1292.
Id.
The court did not quite go this far, but its expressed concern about the effect of this serial technique
on Smith justifies this characterization. See id. at 1295; see also Parry, supra note 16, at 807-10 & nn.366-78
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These concerns seem real, so much so that in Missouri v. Seibert,140 the
Supreme Court itself backtracked from Elstad, tightening its rule to avoid the
worst of these serial-interrogation tactics.141 So seen, Smith is less an
instrumental belt-tightening of Miranda’s decision rule and more an effort to
plug a potentially gaping hole in the heart of the rule; a hole that even the
Supreme Court has come to agree threatens the efficacy of the sole means by
which the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is implemented in the
context of stationhouse questioning. There is, then, a direct relationship
between the rule that Smith advances and the operative proposition that justifies
that rule—a factor suggesting that it is appropriate for the court to render this
decision.
Turning to the impact of Smith’s enhanced decision rule, the SJC’s explicit
reason for restoring the Massachusetts rule to its pre-Elstad contours was to
deter police from strategically circumventing Miranda’s requirements. The
rule seems aimed principally at non-judicial actors, seeking to alter their
behavior, and thus not so plainly the prerogative of the court. However, the
type of police behavior at which Smith’s rule is aimed has the potential to
significantly reduce the effectiveness of Miranda as a decision rule, thus
risking an increase in governmentally compelled statements being offered into
evidence in criminal trials. So, while it is true that unlike the Aguilar-Spinelli
rule, the primary conduct affected by Smith’s rule occurs in the stationhouse
and not the courthouse, the rule applies to a particular interrogation technique,
the apparent purpose of which—to use artifice to avoid Miranda’s
protections—provides evidence of its potential for compelled confessions.
Avoiding this potential for compelled confessions to seep into evidence at
criminal trials provides the court with a plausible, although not dispositive,
claim to legitimacy in making this decision. And, as the SJC noted, restoring
the bright-line presumption that the subsequent, warned statement is tainted
avoids the very difficult fact questions about the “deliberately coercive or
improper police tactics” in the interrogation process,142 thus reducing the
potential for judicial error in the lower courts’ adjudication of selfincrimination claims arising out of serial interrogations.143
Finally, the balance of institutional competence to assess costs and benefits
(cataloging concerns regarding reliability and actual coerciveness of stationhouse interrogation); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 329 (1991)
(arguing privilege protects innocent defendants, and supporting this argument with data suggesting some
correlation between defendants who assert privilege and their ultimate acquittal).
140. 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
141. Id. at 611-12 (holding in “question first and warn later” scenario, government must show that
warnings “function[ed] . . . effectively [to] advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an
admissible statement at [the time of his ensuing interrogation]”).
142. Commonwealth v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 1288, 1295-96 (Mass. 1992).
143. See Berman, supra note 7, at 154 (arguing avoidance of adjudicatory error strongest justification for
decision rules).
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of the rule seems to favor the court over the legislature as the decision maker
on this issue. Although the police practice at which the rule is aimed takes
place beyond judicial eyes, its effectiveness as a tool to avoid Miranda’s
application of the protection against compelled self-incrimination seems selfevident and thus within the ken of both the court and legislature to assess. The
SJC seems better positioned to judge the likely impact of Elstad on criminal
trials, determining whether or not Smith’s restoration of the state’s pre-Elstad
decision rule is necessary to shield the jury from compelled confessions. This
judgment must take into account, as it did in Smith, the parallel protections
offered by the due process voluntariness doctrine and the Commonwealth’s
common-law humane practice rule, which requires that before considering a
confession the jury must find it voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.144 And
the SJC seems to enjoy a competence and legitimacy advantage over the
legislature in assessing the need for the bright-line rule that it restored in Smith
as a means of reducing error by the lower courts in adjudicating selfincrimination claims arising in this context.
Last but not least, the SJC took a classically restrained, supplemental
approach to state constitutionalism that does not foreclose future review—
legislative or judicial—if circumstances merit it.145 The court was careful to
frame the rule as one of common law, avoiding the relative permanence of a
constitutional command, thus maintaining the mutability appropriate for a
decision rule. However one may feel about the merits of Smith’s rule, the
decision appears to be an appropriate exercise of the SJC’s decisionmaking
authority.
2. Mavredakis: A Miranda Expansion for the Legislature
Mavredakis is a different kettle of fish—a case involving an expansion of a
Miranda decision rule better left for the legislature. The Mavredakis case
involved an attorney’s attempt to speak with his client prior to police
interrogation. The question was whether, in addition to the standard Miranda
warnings, the police also have to notify a suspect of his lawyer’s presence and
request to confer in order for his ensuing waiver of the right to counsel to be
valid.146 As noted above, the Supreme Court earlier held, in Moran v. Burbine,
that withholding such information did not affect the validity of a suspect’s
waiver and that the ensuing confession was not taken in violation of the
144. See Smith, 593 N.E.2d at 1296 (citing humane practice rule and noting consistency with rule
announced by court).
145. See Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to
Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 887, 889 (1980) (then-Justice
Wilkins observing that nonconstitutional grounds for rules permit “greater flexibility” that may allow “further
adjustments [to the rule] without altering constitutional principles, and, in areas not within the court’s exclusive
province, the legislature can participate in the process of fixing standards”).
146. See supra Part II.
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Miranda rules.147 In Mavredakis, the SJC disagreed, concluding that Article
XII imposed a “duty to inform a suspect of an attorney’s efforts to render
assistance [, a duty which] is necessary to actualize the abstract rights listed in
Miranda.”148
Although the SJC explicitly tied its holding to Miranda’s “abstract rights,”
the decision rule of Mavredakis bears only a tangential relationship to
Miranda’s underlying operative proposition—the protection against compelled
self-incrimination. Noting its preference “to view the ‘role of the lawyer . . . as
an aid to the understanding and protection of constitutional rights,’ rather than
‘as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdoers,’” the Mavredakis Court
explicitly required that the police inform a suspect in custody about the
presence of his lawyer in order to prevent “police interference with the
attorney-client relationship.”149 That may be good policy, but Article XII’s
privilege against compelled self-incrimination does not provide for a right to
stationhouse counsel, much less any attorney-client relationship.150
Miranda, of course, includes within its warnings a right to counsel during
any custodial interrogation and a right to have counsel appointed if the suspect
cannot afford to retain counsel. Miranda’s decision rule—as elaborated by the
Supreme Court in a series of cases beginning with Edwards v. Arizona151—
goes on to forbid further questioning by police once a suspect invokes that
right, including questioning about other crimes,152 even after the suspect has
consulted with a lawyer.153 The police cannot resume the interrogation unless
the suspect, on his own initiative, agrees to do so.154 This elaboration of
Miranda’s decision rule draws a bright line of protection around a suspect who
declines to undergo custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel,
147. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986).
148. Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 179 (Mass. 2000). The SJC decision was supported
in this regard in earlier, pre-Burbine SJC precedent to the same effect. See Commonwealth v. Sherman, 450
N.E.2d 566, 566 (Mass. 1983); Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 335 N.E.2d 660, 715-17 (Mass. 1975).
149. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d at 179 (quoting Justice Stevens’ dissent in Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
443 (1986)).
150. Two years prior to Miranda, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Supreme Court briefly extended the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel to suspects who had become the focus of police investigation. See 378 U.S. 478,
490-91 (1964). However, the Court almost immediately pulled back from that approach, reserving the Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel for cases in which formal proceedings had begun. See Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 204-06 (1964). In place of Escobedo’s broader Sixth Amendment right to stationhouse counsel
during investigation, the Miranda Court turned to the warnings-and-waiver rule as a means to apply the Fifth
Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination in the stationhouse. The SJC was bound to, and did, follow
the Supreme Court’s lead in these decisions, but it never suggested, much less held, that Article XII’s privilege
against compelled self-incrimination included any right to counsel beyond Miranda. See supra note 148 (citing
pre-Burbine SJC cases, both of which grounded right to counsel in Miranda’s Fifth Amendment decision rule).
151. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
152. See generally Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
153. See generally Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
154. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. This protection lasts so long as the accused remains in custody.
Fourteen days after a break in custody, Edwards’ protection no longer applies. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.
Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010).
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effectively declaring such a suspect off-limits to police interrogators. However,
it does not create a categorical right to a lawyer as part of the operative
proposition protecting against compelled self-incrimination.155 The point of
this corner of Miranda’s decision rule is not to ensure the presence of a lawyer
during custodial interrogation, but rather to provide the suspect with a measure
of control, giving him an iron-clad out when the pressure of interrogation
becomes greater than he is willing to handle by himself.156 To be sure, the
police can respond by arranging for a lawyer to consult with such a suspect, but
they can also—and almost always do—simply leave him alone. If Miranda’s
“right to counsel” means more than this, then every stationhouse statement
given in the absence of counsel would be suspect.157
Where does that leave us? The right to counsel that the SJC seeks to
“actualize” in Mavredakis is not embedded in Article XII’s privilege against
compelled self-incrimination; indeed, it is less a right to counsel than a means
to empower isolated suspects to avoid going it alone during custodial
interrogation. There surely is a cognizable relationship between this “right”
and the operative proposition it is meant to advance, but the two are hardly
congruent. As such, any claim that Mavredakis’ expansion of the decision rule
is integrally related to the meaning of the constitution, and thus the exclusive
prerogative of the court, is suspect.158
Turning to the impact of Mavredakis’ expanded rule, like all Miranda rules
it necessarily affects police officers. However, unlike Smith’s rule, which
plausibly impacts the adjudicatory function as well, the impact of the rule
requiring the additional warning that a lawyer is present seems to stop with the
police. That is because there does not seem to be even a colorable argument
that the additional warning mandated by Mavredakis would have any
significant impact on the likelihood that a compelled confession would find its
way into evidence at a criminal trial. The SJC in Mavredakis does not claim
that in the general run of cases Miranda’s standard warning-and-waiver
construct under-enforces Article XII’s privilege against compelled selfincrimination. Any claim that the extra warning required by Mavredakis would
in some systematic way reduce compelled confessions has to be based on a
conclusion that a suspect whose lawyer (unbeknownst to the suspect) actually
appears at the police station is, for that reason, no longer adequately protected
by the standard warnings against compelled self-incrimination.
155. See William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 982 n.21 (2001).
156. See id. at 981-82.
157. See Ogletree, supra note 5, at 1830; Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 953-55. The point here is not the
wisdom or effectiveness of Miranda’s decision rule(s), but rather the particular role counsel plays in them and
the relationship of that role to the underlying operative proposition protecting against compelled selfincrimination in the stationhouse.
158. See Landsberg, supra note 5, at 964 (arguing legitimacy of judicially created prophylactic rule
proportional to clarity of operative proposition it advances and conceptual connection of rule to underlying
proposition).
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It is hard to imagine how this could be so. To be sure, if the suspect is
informed of his lawyer’s presence, he may be less likely to waive his right to
counsel,159 thus reducing the likelihood of a confession, either because the
lawyer was given access160 or because questioning ceased. But that says
nothing about whether a confession taken after a warning that did not include
notice of the lawyer’s presence would have been compelled. Unless there is
something different—in a way that makes a difference with regard to
compelled self-incrimination—about a suspect whose lawyer unexpectedly
shows up, as compared to the more ordinary and less lucky suspect for whom
no lawyer appears, the impact of this new rule seems random and arbitrary
rather than necessary to correct an under-protective decision rule. Couple this
randomness with the relatively small number of cases in which the lawyer does
appear at the station during interrogation, and the constitutional impact of this
rule in the courtroom seems negligible.
Neither is there any claim that the Mavredakis restoration of Miranda’s
warning-and-waiver requirements would reduce adjudicatory error. The
required notice that a lawyer is available is not a bright-line substitute for
difficult and potentially inconsistent fact-finding in which lower courts would
otherwise have to engage, as was so in Smith. Rather, it is simply an addition
to the required warnings that applies on those occasions when a lawyer seeks to
consult with a potential subject of police interrogation. In Mavredakis, the SJC
did not suggest that this additional warning reduces the potential for
adjudicatory error, and it is hard to see how it might.
Of course, that is not the end of the question. Given the pragmatic reasons
justifying decision rules in general, a rule expansion such as that wrought by
Mavredakis, even though only tangentially connected to its underlying
operative proposition and aimed exclusively at non-judicial actors, would still
be justifiable if its benefits in guiding the application of the operative
proposition outweigh its costs. But given that the courts have no exclusive
claim, arising from the nature of the rule or its impact, to make this judgment,
identifying the appropriate decision maker would have to be based solely on
institutional competence in assessing that cost-benefit balance and political
legitimacy in imposing the revamped rule. Here, the legislature rather than the
courts seems better suited to assess the need for, and to impose, any new rule.
The beginning of any such cost-benefit analysis would be a determination
that the standard Miranda warning-and-waiver requirements under-enforce the
Article XII privilege when a lawyer shows up at the police station and seeks to
159. Interestingly, when the police did tell Mavredakis (while he was writing out his confession) that his
lawyer wanted to speak with him, Mavredakis replied that he wanted first to finish his confession. See
Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Mass. 2000).
160. Justice Harlan, in his Miranda dissent, observed that if a suspect had access to a lawyer “worth his
salt,” there would rarely be a confession. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516 n.12 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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consult with her unknowing client. As noted above, reason alone does not
explain how this apparent happenstance changes anything about the
effectiveness of the standard warning-and-waiver as a decision rule, causing
Miranda’s protections to lose their force for that class of suspects but not for
unrepresented suspects. If there really is a difference here that suggests the
tightened rule, it could only be substantiated through a broad empirical inquiry
that a legislature would be far better equipped to handle than a court. Maybe a
review of actual interrogation experience, expert testimony from interrogation
specialists, psychologists, social scientists, and the like would reveal a basis for
such a distinction that is not readily apparent. But whatever such an inquiry
might reveal, it seems reasonably clear that the case-by-case regimen of judicial
decisionmaking provides an inapt set of tools for such empiricism.
There is another, more plausible, justification for the Mavredakis rule
flowing from the pragmatic character of decision rules. Such rules are, at best,
imperfect in implementing the operative propositions that justify their
existence, and thus it would not be inappropriate to craft a rule that risks overenforcement of an operative proposition—particularly one protecting an
important individual right—in order to ensure against its under-enforcement.161
One might argue that Miranda’s warning-and-waiver construct is a pragmatic
compromise that is acceptable to prevent most stationhouse compulsion, but
that a lawyer would be better (albeit too expensive on a system-wide basis).
However, if a lawyer is actually available (at no expense to the
Commonwealth), there is little harm and—in that case at least—much to gain
by telling the suspect about the lawyer as part of the required warnings.
Assuming that this is a proffered justification for expanding the decision rule,
does it lie with the court—or should it be reserved for the legislature—to make
such a judgment? I think the legislature is, again, the more appropriate
decision maker in this instance. Why?
We start again with the premise that if there is any under-enforcement by
Miranda of Article XII’s operative proposition, it is sufficiently modest to be
generally acceptable. The SJC did not, in Mavredakis, challenge this premise,
and so it seems fair to assume that any problem of Miranda’s general underenforcement is not constitutionally compelling.162 If the legislature did
161. See Caminker, supra note 29, at 8-20, 25-26; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57 (1997); Parry, supra note 16, at 785.
162. Of course, if one does conclude that a lawyer’s presence, coupled with a required warning to the
suspect of that presence, corrects a significant under-enforcement of the operative proposition protecting
against compelled self-incrimination, surely the state would have to reconsider Miranda’s asserted compromise
concerning the right to counsel which Mavredakis corrects. Otherwise, an appropriate level of enforcement of
this core constitutional right would be limited to those lucky (or rich) enough to have a lawyer show up. The
alternative would seem to be a general system of appointed, available stationhouse counsel. I suppose one
could argue that all that really is at stake is the warning, not the lawyer that stands behind the warning. The
arbitrary distribution of Mavredakis’ upgraded warning could be solved by requiring that every suspect be told
not just that he has a right to counsel but that such a lawyer—indeed, his lawyer if you like—is available and
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nothing, there would be little if any cost to efficacy of the privilege.
But what of the costs and benefits of adopting the rule? Assuming that a
suspect told of his lawyer’s presence would invoke his right to counsel and that
the police would allow the consult (as opposed to simply ending the
interrogation), one benefit would be that suspects with access to counsel would
have a better understanding of their constitutional rights at a time when they
could use such advice. That benefit, however, would be limited to the
relatively few suspects whose lawyers show up, and, to the extent that this
benefit would be generally—if not inevitably—confined to those rich enough to
have counsel readily available, the benefit would be unfairly distributed. If the
cure to the benefit’s modest reach or unfair distribution is to provide counsel to
all similarly situated—establishing a categorical right to counsel during
interrogation—that would mark a major departure from Miranda and from
Article XII, unjustified by precedent and conceptually distinct from the
operative proposition Miranda’s decision rules are meant to implement. That
is, such an extension of the right to counsel sounds more of legislation than
judicial interpretation.163 Moreover, any such categorical right to counsel
would carry its own costs, not the least of which is paying for such
appointments; surely a legislative prerogative.
Another cost of a categorical right to stationhouse counsel would likely be
the loss of some number of confessions. Under the assumptions on which
Miranda is based, after the standard warnings and ensuing waivers, none of
these confessions would have been compelled. Each confession would
constitute relevant, often compelling, evidence in a criminal prosecution. Of
course, suspects might routinely waive this enhanced right to counsel, just as
they now often waive Miranda’s more general right to counsel. But if they do
not, there will be fewer interrogations, either because the interrogations will
stop or because lawyers given access will advise suspects not to confess—
advice that will likely be heeded. The legislature is in the best position to
identify and weigh those potential costs and benefits to the polity as a whole,
and to act on that assessment.
As a matter of both institutional competence and legitimacy, then, the
legislature seems to be the branch of government best positioned to decide the
Mavredakis issue. It is not just that the legislature is elected whereas the
ready to give counsel, whether or not that is true. If the suspect nevertheless waives this reified right to
counsel, interrogation could proceed. If he does not, interrogation would cease, just as it now does. The
lawyer is never going to be given access; all that is at issue is what “bucking up” of the suspect is necessary to
overcome the coercion inherent in stationhouse questioning. Such an artifice, although perhaps no greater than
that now in place, does not seem to be what the SJC had in mind when, in Mavredakis, Justice Ireland spoke for
the court and held that the announced rule was “necessary to actualize the abstract rights listed in Miranda.”
See Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d at 178.
163. See Roosevelt, supra note 42, at 1308-09 (observing what separates nature of judicial power from
legislative power is that departures from precedent require conceptual justification as opposed to sheer policy
judgments).
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judges, at least in Massachusetts, are appointed with life tenure (although
democratic legitimacy counts for something). It is also that the costs and
benefits of this policy decision to extend Miranda’s decision rule in this limited
context are not tightly connected to the core operative proposition it is designed
to advance—preventing compelled self-incrimination. Rather, the underlying
concerns seem to involve a more general right to legal counsel, gauging
whether it is fair or practical to recognize such a right given its apparent
random application, considering the fiscal and law-enforcement costs of
extending its reach, and exploring whether there are alternatives that could
address the problem in a less expensive or apparently unfair way (e.g.,
providing for videotaped interrogations if a primary concern is being certain
that there is not undue coercion brought to bear). These are quintessentially
legislative judgments, not ones for a court.
One might argue, however, that neither the court nor the legislature have a
plainly superior claim to decide this issue, and that this is one of those cases in
which the court could appropriately expand the decision rule, leaving it open
for the legislature to consider the issue, perhaps in response to the court’s
decision. Unfortunately, in Mavredakis, the SJC foreclosed that option,
grounding its expansion of Miranda’s decision rule in what it asserted was
Article XII’s “higher standard of protection [against compelled selfincrimination] than that provided by [the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment in] Moran [v. Burbine].”164 This “calcification”165 of the
new rule was as unnecessary as it was unjustified under Article XII precedent.
Taking the latter point first, the SJC asserted that the text, history, and prior
precedent of Article XII justified its claim that the operative proposition of this
state provision—protecting against compelled self-incrimination—is broader
than that of the Fifth Amendment. As noted above,166 this vastly over-reads
Article XII. Its operative proposition may be broader, but only insofar as
Article XII is not limited to a trial right and includes the privilege itself. That
expansive aspect of Article XII has no apparent application in the Mavredakis
issue. Quite simply, the text, history and prior precedent of Article XII together
demonstrate that, other than as just noted, the operative propositions of Article
XII and the Fifth Amendment are the same insofar as the protection against
compelled self-incrimination through police interrogation.
Turning to the necessity that the decision be cast in terms of Article XII,
there is no reason, other than a mistaken conflation of the decision rule and its
underlying operative proposition,167 for this approach. Unless the court felt that
164. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d at 178.
165. Professor Roosevelt so refers to decisions immunized from legislative, or even subsequent judicial,
review by virtue of their asserted constitutional foundation. See Roosevelt, supra note 29, at 1692-93.
166. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
167. See Roosevelt, supra note 29, at 1692 (observing courts sometimes conflate these two kinds of
constitutional decisions, needlessly injecting decision rules with inflexibility).
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it needed the fig leaf of broader constitutional cover to shore up the otherwise
nebulous connection between Article XII’s self-incrimination protection and its
proposed extension of Miranda’s decision rule, it could have announced the
new rule as a matter of state common law. That would have given effect to the
court’s judgment that the decision rule needed to provide additional protection,
at the same time leaving the issue open for further consideration by the
legislature or perhaps even the court itself.
3. Martin: The Easiest and Hardest Case
Martin, it will be recalled,168 asks whether a gun, which the police found as
the result of an unwarned statement elicited from Martin in violation of
Miranda, should be suppressed. In Patane, the Supreme Court had previously
held, on virtually identicalfacts, that a gun should not be suppressed, but the
Court did so by reasoning that arguably cut back on the scope of the Fifth
Amendment’s operative proposition, conceptualizing the protection against
compelled self-incrimination as a trial right fully satisfied once the compelled
statement is barred from evidence. This view of the Fifth Amendment,
essentially reducing the privilege to a decision rule necessary to implement the
trial right, seems inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and, more to the
point, is inconsistent with longstanding SJC precedent construing Article XII to
include the privilege within its operative proposition. As noted, the Article XII
privilege protects against not just a governmental act compelling a statement
but against compelling a witness through his statements to lead the government
to witnesses or evidence that might incriminate him.169
If that is what Martin stands for—reading Article XII to prevent the police
from forcing Martin to lead them to the gun that incriminates him—the
question of whether to suppress the gun is plainly one for the court. The
remedy of suppression flows directly from, indeed, seems required by, the
operative proposition itself—a reaffirmation and modest extension of the SJC’s
century-old interpretation of Article XII in Emery’s Case. That is what courts
are supposed to do—tell us what the constitution means.
Martin, of course, does not involve a direct application of Article XII’s
privilege but rather its application through Miranda’s decision rule, and from
that perspective the issue is one of remedying a decision rule violation. Who
should decide that is more complicated, particularly because in Martin the SJC
seemed far more concerned with using the remedy of suppression to deter
police misconduct rather than as a measure to ensure that Martin received the
full protection of Article XII’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Of course, we are not bound by the way in which the SJC framed the remedy
168. See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text (describing circumstances and rationale of Martin
decision).
169. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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question, and if Article XII’s privilege protects Martin against being compelled
by the government to lead the authorities to the gun,170 then suppressing the
gun—even as a remedy for a Miranda violation—seems an integral part of the
constitutional protection it implements. From that perspective, the decision to
expand Miranda’s remedy to include derivative fruits is a wholly appropriate
judicial act.
But conceptualizing the issue as the SJC did in Martin—suppressing the gun
to deter police from ignoring Miranda’s decision rule—makes the remedy no
more than a means to advance the underlying constitutional interest.171 So
seen, suppression of the gun is not Martin’s right at all; neither is it a decision
rule designed to guide lower courts in applying the operative proposition. It is
a tool intended to prod non-judicial actors—the police—to obey Miranda’s
requirements. From this perspective, it is not at all clear that the court enjoys a
special claim to impose the remedy of suppression. The right is clear; the
decision rule that implements that right is clear; the only purpose of the
expanded remedy is the policy to encourage police to respect and apply
Miranda when interrogating suspects. This sounds like a legislative task as
much as a judicial one.
Turning to the question of institutional competence and political legitimacy,
this factor, too, depends on how one characterizes the nature of the remedy. If
we see the remedy as tightly wound into the privilege itself, integral to the
protection against being compelled to lead the authorities to incriminating
evidence, the court has the edge in competence and legitimacy. In this view,
the remedy of suppression fits tightly with the operative proposition, and it is
the court that should make this decision—as both a competence matter and a
normative matter.
But if the remedy is no more than a stick to encourage police compliance
with Miranda’s decision rule, the remedy represents a policy choice with costs
and benefits that the legislature—as a matter of empirical competence and
democratic legitimacy—ought to make. What are the costs? The major cost,
as opponents of the exclusionary rule are quick to point out,172 is lost evidence,
170. See supra text accompanying note 106.
171. See Klein, supra note 13, at 1047-48.
172. Indeed, this was the basis on which Justices Kennedy and O’Connor concurred in Patane, never
reaching the question of whether the Fifth Amendment is no more than a trial right. See United States v.
Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 645 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). This debate concerning the exclusionary rule as
an appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation continues unabated in the Fourth Amendment context. See
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009). The Herring Court, 5 to 4, held that an arrest based on a
warrant that had been recalled did not require suppression of contraband seized during the ensuing search
incident to that arrest because, due to a negligent bookkeeping error by a police clerical employee, the arresting
officer reasonably believed there was an outstanding warrant. Id. at 697-98. Couched in terms of the goodfaith exception to the exclusionary rule, this decision was but another adjustment to the incidental right to
suppression as a remedy for constitutional error, and the cost-benefit deterrence arguments concerning this
remedy are rehearsed once again. Compare id. at 701-03 (majority opinion), with id. at 707-10 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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in this case (and in the case of most derivative fruits of Miranda violations)
relevant and highly reliable physical evidence. The corresponding benefit is
giving police the incentive to obey Miranda’s requirements—certainly an
important interest. It may be that there is incentive enough, as many argue,173
in the certain suppression of a statement taken in violation of Miranda, and that
the additional suppression of the gun exacts too high a cost for the marginal
incentive thereby purchased. But maybe not. If an officer calculates that
without the unwarned question he will not find the gun, why not question
without the warnings? While the resulting statement will be suppressed, as
long as the gun is safe from suppression it seems like a good bet. Is that how
police officers think? Is that how they act?
These are the basic assessments on which the incidental right or remedy of
suppression rest, and they do not seem to be assessments that require any
special judicial expertise.174 They also involve issues in which the public and
their elected representatives have an abiding interest. To be sure, the court has
a claim to legitimacy as well. The privilege against compelled selfincrimination—implemented in the stationhouse solely by Miranda’s decision
rule—is an important protection to the individual against serious governmental
overreaching. And while the public has an interest in how this question of
remedy is resolved, giving legitimacy to a legislative resolution, the collective
right to majoritarian decisionmaking at some point gives way to ensuring the
protection of individual rights, which is a traditional and legitimate judicial
function.175 In the end, it may be that this question is one as to which it is
unclear who the decision maker should be. In that instance, the SJC’s path in
Martin seems defensible even if analytically murky. The issue presented itself
and the court made the call; however, it did so not in the calcified script of a
constitutional requirement but as a common law remedy that promotes the
Article XII privilege.176 That way, as was so in Smith, it remains open for the
legislature or the court to take a second look.
V. CONCLUSION
The term “prophylactic rule” has received something of a bad reputation,
mostly due to its pejorative use by conservatives in their decades-long effort to
roll back Miranda’s warning-and-waiver requirements. But it provides a useful
way to look at constitutional doctrine, including, as I have argued, the
interaction between state and federal constitutionalism. Commentators,

173. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence joined by Justice O’Connor, so argued in Patane, delivering the
two votes necessary for a majority on that basis. See Patane, 542 U.S. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
174. See Strauss, supra note 45, at 969 (arguing no good reason for precluding Congress and states from
trying to balance costs and benefits attributable to particular decision rules).
175. See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1709, 1713.
176. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 204-05 (2005).
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lawyers and judges may never agree about the legitimacy of state courts
interpreting state constitutional provisions to mandate broader operative
propositions than the Supreme Court finds in virtually identical federal
provisions, but there is no reason a state should be precluded from broadening
the protections of a decision rule (adopting Mitchell Berman’s more general
and less provocative term) if circumstances within that state suggest it. This is
so even where—as with Massachusetts and Miranda—a state’s courts have
expressly declined to adopt the federal decision rule under the state’s
constitution.
Decision rules, while surely constitutional, are, by design, instruments to
implement constitutional provisions, not vessels of their meaning, and as such
they are fairly subject to periodic adjustment. Recognizing a state’s authority
to work such an adjustment, as long as the adjusted decision rule is no less
protective of its underlying operative proposition than the rule it modified, has
no impact on the Supreme Court’s exclusive authority to decide what the
Constitution means; the operative proposition remains the same, if anything
more fully enforced. Whether the decision rule is expanded as a matter of
federal law or state law, the operative proposition remains unchanged.
These are useful distinctions as a state court considers whether it should
invoke its constitution to go beyond the protections that the Supreme Court has
held the Constitution to require, distinctions on which the Massachusetts SJC
and many state courts have not focused. What kind of constitutional expansion
is at issue—a decision rule (or a doctrinal cousin such as a remedy/incidental
right) or an operative proposition? If it is a decision rule, Miranda being the
prime example, there should be no objection to looking to state law for the
necessary adjustment.
But just because a proposed constitutional expansion involves a decision
rule does not mean that a state court should enjoy carte blanche to consider that
expansion. In many instances, as a matter of institutional competence and/or
political legitimacy, the state’s legislature ought to decide the issue. If a
decision rule or its remedy is being used more to regulate non-judicial actors,
such as police, than to provide a means to guide courts in implementing an
operative proposition, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, and if the
contours and justification of the rule depend more on balancing perceived costs
and benefits than on applying interpretive principles, it may well be that a court
should defer to a legislative judgment concerning its proper reach. At the very
least, unless it is plain (as few constitutional matters are) that such a judgment
is one exclusively for the court, a decision to expand a decision rule ought not
to be in the unalterable script of the constitution but rather should take the form
of constitutional common law, open to possible reconsideration by the
legislature or future courts. After all, possible reconsideration is part and parcel
of the beast.

